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1. Project Data
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2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=HIghly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=-ighly Ltkely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly
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Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance- S
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Project at Risk at Any Time No
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3.1 Original Objective:
The projectfs overall objective was to promote the effectiveness of an urban rail transit system in Pusan
City, through demand management measures and modal integration and policy reforms in areas of public
parking and transit pricing. The specific goals identified in the SAR were to (a) increase ridership and cost
recovery of the subway network through an integrated strategy that includes transport demand management
(TDM), construction of intermodal facilities, and expansion of the transit system; (b) enhance PUTA's
subway capacity so it could accommodate future growth and serve as an altemative to auto use; and (c)
strengthen the capacity of existing institutions to plan and program urban transport investments.
The objectives of the project were clear and supported the Govemment's priorities of the time. In the early
1990's Korea's industrialization, improved living standards and rapid population growth were accompanied
by rapid increases in nearly all types of transportation. The city's total passenger traffic was projected to
grow at 5% per annum between 1993 and 2001, with the biggest increases anticipated in subway and
suburban rail traffic at about 15% per year. The Government's National Transport Action Plan, 1993,
provided for capacity expansion and traffic system management (TSM) strategies for urban areas.
Capacity expansion was planned for roads, rail, airports, and subway systems. New subways were
planned for four cities with populations greater than a million, with new lines to be added to the existing
systems in Seoul and Pusan. The project took an integrated approach to these issues, through the use of
demand management and improvements in supply directed towards encouraging and facilitating use of the
subway and improving the efficiency of the urban transportation system.
As discussed in the text, the viability of the program depended upon two key assumptions: (i) the proposed
demand management interventions would influence behavior in desired ways; and (ii) ridership growth
would continue in accordance with past trends. In retrospect, largely due to external factors, neither
expectation came true to the extent anticipated.
3.2 Revised Objective
The original project objectives were not revised.
3.3 Original Components:
The project included three components, at an estimated project cost of US$365.4 million (including
contingencies and taxes). The base cost was estimated at US$286.7 million; physical and price
contingencies at US$45.7 million, and taxes at US$32.9 million (for details of actuals and estimates, see
Annex 2). The individual components are briefly described below:
Component A - Congestion Management (US$ 52.93 million). Introduction of a system to manage
vehicle traffic and encourage the use of subway and bus transport; this was intended to be the first step in
the development of a comprehensive congestion management program for Pusan. The component included
the following:
(i) Transport Demand Management - Modal Integration Facilities at Nopo and Tongnae included the
construction of parking areas, bus turnarounds and passenger pick up facilities (US$ 27.98 million).
(ii) Transportation Systems Management strategies to be implemented along the East-West Bus Lane to
improve bus speeds, particularly during the peak traffic periods (US$ 2.18 million).
(iii) 5 year Transport Demand Management/Transportation Systems Management program to develop a
comprehensive policy and action plan for improved traffic management (US$ 22.8 million).
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Component B - Expansion of Pusan Urban Transit System Capacity (US$ 309 million). Purchase of
subway cars to supplement trains on Line 1, and cars for trains on Line 2 which was planned to open in
1996. PUTA's capacity expansion plan called for an additional 310 subway cars, of which 258 cars (43
trains of 6-cars each) were for Line 2 (Phase I), and 52 for trains on Line 1. The latter 52 cars were
intended to reduce peak period overcrowding on Line I by increasing the length of 26 existing trains from 6
to 8 cars each. In 1994, during peak periods, over 230 passengers occupied the space of an average rail
car, which was designed to hold 125.
Component C - Institutional Development (US$ 3.42 million). Improvement in staff expertise in urban
transport investment planning/programming at the national and local levels through short and long-term
training courses, workshops, manuals and overseas training programs. It was agreed that the training and
education program would be financed by MOT, while the project financed the following studies: (i) Pusan
Transit Fare Structure Study; (ii) 5-year TDM/TSM Program Study; and (iii) a Study to identify
Altemative Long-term Financing Strategies for PUTA. Technical assistance (TA) consisting of one or two
professionals to advise the Pusan City Govemment on the implementation of TDM and TSM measures was
also included. The three sub-components had budgets as follows:
(i) Training (US$ 1.8 million)
(ii) Studies (US$ 1.5 million)
(iii) Technical Assistance (US$ 0.12 million)
3.4 Revised Components*
The project components were not revised. During project implementation the following Borrower requests
were approved by IBRD.
(i) The original closing date was extended on April 16, 1999, by one year, from June 30, 2000 to June
30, 2001; a second one year extension was approved on April 4, 2001, primarily to accommodate the
delivery of the last batch of subway cars.
(ii) The Loan Agreement was amended on March 22, 1999, to allow purchase of subway cars for Phase
II of Line 2 with the savings generated by the fluctuation of the exchange rate. The original
agreement included train cars for only Phase I, Line 2.
(iii) In October 2001, the Borrower requested cancellation of the unwithdrawn amount of
US$7,931,005.09; the request was approved and the loan and commitment charges for this amount
ceased to accrue from November 2, 2001.
3.5 Quality at Entry:
The project was well prepared, and quality at entry is rated satisfactory -- in addition to the SAR, a
comprehensive report on the Korean transport sector was completed and provided a rich background for the
project itself. Overall, the project was in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy, as articulated in
the Financial Intermediation Project (Loan 3689-KO); the key elements with a bearing on the development
objectives were identified during the preparation process and lessons from previous Bank projects in the
urban transport sector in Korea were incorporated.
At the time the project was being prepared, Korea had passed the income threshold for graduation from the
Bank, a graduation process had been agreed with the Government and was underway. The Bank's strategy
was to continue lending until graduation m areas where Bank involvement would provide value added, e.g.,
through sectoral policy advice or institutional strengthening, in addition to the resource transfer itself.
Urban transport was deemed one such area, as demand for urban infrastructure services was growing
rapidly due to rising incomes and consumption. The Pusan Urban Transport Project was designed as part
of a comprehensive metropolitan area program to reduce traffic congestion and air pollution from vehicles,
while improving coordination among different modes of transport.
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4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:
Overall, the project outcome is Satisfactory. The project has succeeded in its overall objective to promote
the effectiveness of an urban rail transit system in Pusan City, through demand management measures,
modal integration, and policy reforms in the areas of public parking and transit pricing. Due to efforts by
PCG and PUTA, both within and transcending the framework of this project the quality of passenger
services has been maintained or improved, and the overall capacity of the subway network to meet current
and future travel demand has been increased. The objective of improvements in PUTA's operational cost
recovery was adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis, 1997-98, compounded by a slowdown in
population growth and decline in densities due to urban sprawl. The achievement of the specific objectives
of the Project is presented below.
A. Expansion of Pusan Urban Transit System Capacity
The progress towards this objective has been satisfactory. PUTA has significantly expanded the subway
network and increased its service capacity while maintaining a very good track record in terms of safety.
336 rail cars have been purchased, delivered, and are in use on Line 2 of the metro system. The number of
cars purchased under the project is higher than the originally planned 310; the increase in cars bought was
made possible by the devaluation of the Won during the Asian crisis. The overall increase in capacity on
Phase 1, Line 2, is thus higher than what was planned under the project. The number of cars in service on
Line 1 has also increased as PUTA used its own funds, which would otherwise have been directed to
funding cars for Line 2, to procure 60 cars for Line 1. These have been used to increase the length of trains
on Line 1 from 6 to 8 cars each.
At the same time that service capacity on Line 1 and Phase 1, Line 2, has been increased, the size of the
subway network has also been substantially increased, though the Bank did not participate in the financing
of the civil works for network expansion. With the completion and opening of Lines 2 and 3, the subway
network will have more than tripled in length from the original network of Line 1 (32 km) to a network of
more than 100 kms in length, with 5 transfer stations and more than 100 stations at an investment cost of
6,000 billion Won or about USD 6 billion equivalent. (See Section 4.2, Outputs by Component, and
Section 5.4, Costs and Financing).
While system capacity has been successfully expanded, the subsidiary goal of influencing modal shares in
favor of mass transit has been less successful. The share of cars in total trips (all modes) has increased
from approximately 17% in 1991 to about 30% in 2001. At the same time, metro ridership has not
expanded as rapidly (see table 1). Following a period of passenger growth at the rate of 12% per annum
between 1988 and 1993, the average annual growth in ridership declined to 3.6 % between 1994 and 2001.
Consequently, between 1991 and 2001, the share of metro in total trips (all modes) increased to about 12%
as compared to a share of 22.5 % forecast at appraisal. As the latter number includes ridership for Line 2
and Line 2 only became fully operational towards the end of 2002, there is room for an increase in metro's
modal share as Line 2 ridership matures.
These numbers reflect the shift in Busan's traffic mix since the time of appraisal - automobiles have
assumed greater significance than before. In Busan, a steady rise in income and living standards,
demographic and industrial land use changes, and the development of Korea's car manufacturing industry
were all factors influencing the ownership and use of cars (see section 5.1). Compared with 1991 car
ownership has increased from 76 vehicles per thousand population to 141 per thousand in 2001. This
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despite the growing vehicle ownership restraint measures, including a certificate system that
proves the availability of a garage for each new car buyer, and the obligation to purchase subway
bonds while purchasing a vehicle, to curb growth in motorization.
In the past, urban transport prices in-Korea have been regulated by the central government in the interest
of inflation control. More recently the authority to set tariffs has been decentralized to local governments -
responsibility for bus and taxi fares was decentralized in January 2000 while subway fares setting authority
was transferred in April 1999. Since decentralization, subway fares have been increased but remain
below full cost. Direct costs for private vehicles also do not reflect full costs to society, despite
recent increases in fuel prices. For example, the cost of a 10 km trip by car is estimated to be
over 600 Won. A metro ticket for travel over the same distance costs 600 Won; any marginal
cost advantage the metro has, is not sufficient to overcome the greater convenience and comfort
of travel by car. The regulated prices tend to stimulate transport demand and distort modal choices.
In general, usage costs tend to favor private cars over public transport and even buses have been losing
their share of total trips though they are the dominant public transport mode in Busan. In fact, the share of
all public transport (bus, taxi, MRT) in passenger movement has declined from about 80% in 1991 to
approximately 68 % in 2001.
Table 1: Modal Share (Actual versus Forecast)
Modal share (%) 1991 (actual) 1997 (forecast) 2001 (forecast) 2001 (actual) (i)
Cars 16.8 18.6 17.9 30
Taxi 19.9 21.3 16.7 14
Bus 51.3 43.7 40.7 42
Subway 8.8 13 4 22 5 12
Others 3.2 3.2 2.7 2
Source SAR Annex 15
(i) Estimates from different sources
B. Increase in Cost Recovery
Increasing cost recovery was one of the development objectives of the project cited m the SAR, and it was
incorporated as an operating ratio covenant in the Loan Agreement. The target, starting in 1996, was to
maintain an operating ratio of 100; i.e., PUTA's total revenues from passenger fares and advertising should
be at least equal to total operating costs (includes working costs, depreciation of rolling stock and
equipment plus a replacement reserve).
Table 2: Trends in PUTA's Cost Recovery
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(a) Recovery of working 77 7 77 9 77.1 89.4 69.3 52.8 63.4 67.3 67 7
costs & depreciation (rolling
stock +equipment) (%)
(b) Target for (a) (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(c) Recovery of working 100.5 98.8 94.9 100.1 83.6 73 5 84.4 87.6 88 9
costs & depreciation (rolling
stock only) (%)
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It is seen from Table 2 that the objective of full cost recovery was not achieved. During implementation, the
Bank focused on recovery of operating costs (working costs plus rolling stock and equipment depreciation).
On this measure, PUTA did better; between 1994 and 1997, PUTA was within a few percentage points of
the target and in 1994 and 1997 did meet the target of 100% cost recovery. The increase in depreciation
associated with the start of operations on Line 2 was a main factor in the failure to meet the target in 1999.
The intention was to maintain and improve PUTA's excellent operational performance and strengthen its
ability to service existing and future debt. The improvement in operating cost recovery was to be
accomplished through a combination of fare increases in step with inflation and increased ridership.
The history of fare increases, shown in Table 3, Annex 3, is of interest. There were four fare increases in
the period 1994-2001, representing cumulatively a real increase of about 44% in the base fare and about
27% in the average fare paid. In the early part of the project, up to 1998, real fares were maintained at the
1995 level. Subsequently, fare increases exceeded the general inflation level by a substantial margin. For
example, a base fare increase of 11% was approved in 1999 and another one of 20% in 2000, while the
inflation rate was less than 1% in 1999 and 2.25% in 2000. Between 1999 and 2001, average fares
increased by approximately 35%. This was partially offset by a loss of traffic, so that the real increase m
business revenue from Line 1 was roughly 30% over this period.
Slow ridership growth rates have been one of the factors in PUTA's failure to meet cost recovery targets.
The growth rate of metro usage has been impacted by the following factors: delays in completion of Line 2,
the 1997-98 Asian Crisis, inadequate integration of service with buses and other vehicles, suburbanization
and motorization trends.
Table 3: PUTA Ridership Trend - Actual vs. Forecast
Ridership/year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Actual ('000) 195,640 213,799 218,347 218,307 203,430 224,254 240,920 250,238 224,628
(Jan-Oct)
Line 1 205,000 201,000 198,665 162,072
Line 2 18,600 40,000 51,572 62,556
(phase I (phase 1) (phase I) (phase I)
Jun-Dec)
SAR Forecast ('000) 208,737 230,222 232,768 241,389 335,421 441,471 446,383 528,912 600,285
(wAine 2, (w/line 2, (wAline 2, (wAine 2, (wAine 2,
phase I) phase I) phase I) phase I phase I
and II) and II)
Line I and 2: Aide Memoire April 22, 2002
Discrepancies in Row 2 and the sum of rows 3 and 4 are due to rounding of numbers.
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Table 3b: PUTA Ridership Trend - Actual vs. Forecast
(adjusted for delays in completion of Line 2)
Ridership/year 1997 2000 2001
(year 1, Line 2, phase I) (year 2, Line 2, phase I)
Actual ('000) 218,307 240,920 250,238
Line 1 218,307 201,000 198,665
Line 2 40,000 51,573
(phase I) (phase I)
SAR Forecast 241,389 335,421 441,471
('000) I (w/line 2, phase I) (w/lne 2, phase I)
In reviewing ridership trends it is necessary to take into account the country's economic situation during the
project period. In 1997, Korea suffered a financial crisis accompanied by a rapid depreciation of its
currency. The GDP growth rate fell from 5.5% in 1997 to -5.8% in 1998; unemployment increased from
less than 2.5 percent of the workforce before the crisis to 8.7 percent in 1999. The consequences of the
economic decline were felt in PUTA's ridership - passenger demand on Line I actually declined in 1998
with a marginal recovery in 1999. Passenger and advertising revenues fell by about 10% between 1997-98
while working costs were driven up by the depreciation of the Won. The costs of materials and supplies
alone increased at an average annual rate of more than 26% between 1994 and 2001. Korea's labor laws
did not allow reduction in skilled labor costs while need for professional staff pushed up labor costs with
the opening of Line 2. PUTA's management plans not to hire additional staff for the operation of Line 3.
This is expected to lower unit operating costs and improve PUTA's financial position in the coming years.
The project supported pilot TDMI/SM measures for better bus-subway integration and improvement of
subway utilization. These included, inter alia, introduction of a bus priority scheme on the East-West
highway linked to the Tongnae facility, urban bus turn arounds, bus, taxi, and car pick up facilities, and
construction of park and ride facilities at Nopodong and Tongnae stations. The pilots have been fully
successful in creating convenient transfer possibilities between the subway and road based vehicles. While
some of the physical deficiencies in improving bus-subway network connections have been addressed, some
major changes have either been recently completed or are outstanding: the inter-city bus terminal was
re-located from the CBD to the Nopo station area as recently as September 2001 while the highway
connection to the Nopo metro station is still to be constructed. Both of these are expected to increase the
accessibility of the metro at Nopo station and facilitate metro usage.
Feeder bus services, for suburban commuters, to the metro are inadequate and available at few subway
stations. PUTA attempted to remedy this by offering connecting services by mini buses in residential areas,
but faced strong opposition from private operators. Bus operators continue to oppose route restructuring
and perceive themselves as competing with, rather than complementing, the subway. Operators claim to
have lost ridership with the opening of Line 2: at least 6 bus routes were closed in 1999-2000 and 12
shortened with the opening of Line 2. Inadequate bus-MRT service and fare integration continues to be a
major obstacle in improving metro patronage levels. Since the bus system is run privately and the subway
is publicly owned, bus-metro integration is taking longer to coordinate and implement. It has been a major
contribution of the project to promote recognition by the City, PUTA, and private bus operators of the need
for inter-modal integration. Up to now the city has introduced a fare card, the Hanaro fare card, which can
be used for both the bus and metro systems. Working with the MoF and MoTC, the City is getting ready to
implement revenue sharing arrangements with the bus sector which would allow introduction of an
integrated bus-metro fare system. Once implemented, these would go a long way towards integrating and
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improving the efficiency of public transport.
Suburbanization and motorization trends in Busan, discussed in Section 4.1 A above, have not favored the
use of the subway. Subway usage has been affected by population movements driven by the financial crisis
and real estate developments in the Busan metropolitan area. Most strikingly, overall population within
Busan actually declined by 2% from 1991-2001. The decline in major industries such as shoe
manufacturing and re-location of others, including Dongguk Steel and Cheil Sugar, to the suburbs, affected
the growth and location of Busan's population (see section 5.1). Low income populations living along Line
1 have been re-locating to Gupo and Hwamyung, along the west corridor of Line 2. These residential areas
offer low cost housing and easy road access to the re-located factories in the Kimnhae area, near the airport;
this area is not served by the metro. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this has adversely impacted
ridership on Line 1. Benefits to Line 2 are not yet evident, and will be seen as the ridership numbers for
Line 2 mature. Overall, suburbanization and motorization trends have led to an increase in average distance
travelled, reduced public transport accessibility, and more passenger-car dependent travel patterns.
A major factor in the slower than expected growth of metro usage has been the delay in completion of Line
2. The construction of Line 2 was phased such that the first phase was built in a less populated area to
accommodate future growth while the second phase was set in a high density area. While the costs of
operating line 2 are already part of PUTA's expenses, ridership from line 2 has still to mature as
completion of both phases was substantially behind schedule, and lagged the completion dates estimated at
appraisal. Both phases of Line 2 experienced completion delays of about one and a half years each. Since
phase II, of Line 2, was completed only in September 2002, ridership numbers for phase II are not yet
available, and the usage levels for phase I will be impacted by the opening of Phase II. As patronage on line
2 matures, PUTA's operational cost recovery is expected to increase.
Table 4: Construction Schedule for Line 2
Section Length (kms) Scheduled SAR expected start Actual start of operations
completion of operations
Line 2: Phase I 22.4 1996 1998 June 1999
(Hopo - Somyon)
Lme 2. Phase II 16.7 1998 2001 September 2002
( Somyon - Jadong) 
_
Line 3 Not part of SAR Phase 1: 2005 (expected)
calculations . Phase II: 2007 (expected)
Sources: SAR (Annex 4)
ICR mission, 2002
C. Financial Status of PUTA
Going beyond the financial covenant agreed under the Loan, the real concern during appraisal was the
sustainability of PUTA's capital financing program. At the end of 1993, the outstanding principal of loans
held by PUTA totaled W1,394 billion. Between 1990-93, PUTA's annual borrowings were well in excess
of the amount needed to cover construction costs. The net difference was used to meet interest and
principal payments on existing debt. The upcoming borrowing requirements for Line 2 were large and also
relied on short term debt. The practice of rolling over existing debt with short term debt, in conjunction
with borrowing for ongoing construction, had the potential to put PUTA into a position of ever increasing
debt.
In December 1993, a debt management plan was formulated whereby the central govemment committed to
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finance 25% and the PCG to finance 20% of PUTA's capital costs with cash grants. However, to
strengthen PUTA's balance sheet, durng the course of project implementation, the central government and
PCG actually contributed a much higher share -- 78% of the investment costs of Line 2 were financed by
the central govermment and PCG. A hundred percent of the capital costs of Line 3 are being borne by the
central government and PCG. Despite the higher capital contributions for Line 2, PUTA's financial
position has weakened over the course of the project and since 1998, PUTA has received both capital and
operating subsidies.
At present, PUTA needs a constant external cash injection each year to meet its cash shortages due to
operational losses, ongoing capital investment, and debt service requirements. The subsidy requirements
are higher than anticipated at appraisal. For example, in 2001, PUTA received government
subsidies of Won 461.8 billion as compared to the estimated Won 132.2 billion, at appraisal. The
company's liquidity problems have deteriorated in the 1995-2001 period, with the current ratio
falling from 0.75 m 1995 to a very unsatisfactory 0.07 in 2001.
Starting in 1997, PUTA's total debt has exceeded or been equal to its total assets. Further, the
ratio of current liabilities (maturities of less than one year) to total debt has increased from about
17% in 1995 to 30 % in 2001. Most of PUTA's debt is inherited from the borrowings for Line 1.
It is estimated that about three quarters of all debt has a 3 to 5 year maturity. At the end of 200 1, the
outstanding principal on loans stood at W1,924 billion and this is expected to continue growing (See Annex
3b, Table 3). Most of PUTA's debts are inherited from the borrowings for Line 1: about 80% of PUTA's
total interest payments in 2001, and about 83% of its principal payments in 2001 were on pre-'94 debt. It
is clear that PUTA cannot survive without a restructuring of its balance sheet involving either earlier
repayment of its debt and/or removal of debt from its balance sheet (See Annex 3b, for scenario analysis).
Regardless of the method and timing to clean PUTA's balance sheet, it is likely that in the future the central
government will shoulder an even greater burden. After restructuring, the concern would be if PUTA can
meet its operational expenses. PUTA's ability to recover operating expenditures will depend on growth in
metro ridership and fare increases. It is expected that patronage will improve as Line 2 ridership matures.
With regard to fares, although the transit market could potentially absorb higher fares, fare increases would
need to be carefully assessed for potential impact on ridership, before implementation.
In sum, the increase in PUTA's overall debt is due mainly to borrowings to finance pre-94 principal and
interest payments for Line 1. The situation has been aggravated, in part, by delays in completion of Line 2,
motorization and suburbanization trends, and the financial crisis. On the positive side, the government has.
improved the capital structure for Line 2, funding an increased share of capital costs, and reducing PUTA's
debt burden from the construction of Line 2. For Line 3, the local and central government are providing
100% financing. So far, under MOT ownership, PUTA has received financial support from the
government, as needed. As per law, the ownership of PUTA has to revert back to PCG in 2007. If this
transfer does take place, the sustainability of PUTA's operations will depend on growth in ridership and the
City's capacity to provide adequate financial support for PUTA.
-9-
4.2 Outputs by components:
Component A. Congestion Management is rated Satisfactory, based on the following:
(i) PCG has changed the city's parking policies to discourage parking and the use of private vehicles in
the CBD. City investment for new parking is now mainly directed for park-and-ride facilities for
metro passengers at suburban metro stations. In the CBD, parking supply has been reduced and
public parking charges have been increased to levels comparable with private parking fees.
(ii) Construction of modal integration facilities was completed in two subway stations - Nopodong and
Tongnae - to allow passengers to transfer more easily from one mode to another. These included
urban bus turn-arounds, and bus, taxi and car pick up facilities. New park-and-ride facilities were
constructed in Nopo (348 car spaces), and in Tongnae the parking lot was expanded, adding 273
parking spaces to reach a total of 419. The benefits from the transfer facilities at the Nopo-dong
station were linked to the re-location of the inter-city bus terminal from the CBD to Nopodong. The
inter-city bus terminal was completed in September 2001, and monthly ridership at this metro station
has already increased by about 20%. Ridership at this station is expected to continue to increase.
(iii) TSM measures to improve traffic performance on the East-West highway were linked to the Tongnae
inter-modal facility. A bus priority scheme on a 4.7 km link, along with junction and bus stop
improvements, on this highway has increased speeds from 14 kms per hour to over 20 krns per hour.
Moreover, operations of the Tongnae Road intersection have improved substantially.
(iv) Congestion management measures identified in the Five-year TDM/TSM Study under the project
have become part of the City governrnent's agenda. Implementation of the following, inter alia, is
under way: bus priority schemes on 17 road sections totaling 78.14 kms, installation of watching
cameras on bus-only lanes; and doubling of parking spaces in park-and ride facilities between 1995
and 2002.
Component 1B. Expansion of Pusan Urban Transit System is rated Satisfactory. The project has been
successful in expanding the service capacity of the metro. The largest share of the loan proceeds ($82.08
million) was used to purchase 336 railways cars (56 trains of 6 cars each) - 26 more than the 310 originally
planned. The increase in cars purchased was made possible by the devaluation of the Won while the
contract for cars was denominated in Wons. The overall increase in capacity is thus much higher than what
was planned at appraisal. According to the technical review for the ICR, the cars purchased meet or exceed
the contracted technical specifications, comply with the quality assurance and inspection requirements and
are presently being used on Line 2. The number of cars on service on Line I have also increased as PUTA
used its own funds to procure 60 cars for Line 1.
The total metro network has also expanded significantly since 1994. In 1994, the network consisted of one
line with a total length of 32.5 km and 34 stations. During the project implementation period, PUTA
expanded its capacity and coverage with the opening of Line 2. With the opening of line 3, scheduled for
2003, the network will have more than tripled in length to about 102 km, with 5 transfer stations, and a
total of more than 100 stations. The Bank loan did not finance any of the civil works for network
expansion, which cost an estimated 6,000 billion Won (or about USD 6 billion equivalent (See section 5.4
Costs and Financing and Annex 3b). Table 5 below shows the construction costs of the Busan subway.
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Table 5: Busan Subway Construction Costs
Line Construction Period Length (kms) Construction costs
(billion won)
Line 1 1981-1994 32.5 975.1
Nopo-Shinpyong
Line 2 Phase I 1991-1999 22 4 1,367.1
Hopo-Somyon
Line 2 Phase II 1994-2002 16.7 1,167.0
Somyon-Chwadong
Line 2 extension 1998-2012 11.3 409.4
(Yangsan Line) _
Line 3 1996-2007 29.5 2,117.3
(estimated)
Total 112.4 6,035.9
Component C. Institutional Development was Satisfactory. The various studies under the project were
carried out as planned. The Bank reviewed the details of the MOT training program in the earlier
stages of implementation. The review indicated a well developed and functioning training
program which responds to national needs and is financed accordingly. This reduced the need for
Bank follow up and monitoring during supervision.
The Busan Urban Subway Financing Study, completed in September 1996, appears to have influenced the
correction of the capital structure for Lines 2 and 3. The government has committed to 100% grant
financing for line 3 construction costs, and has substantially increased its contribution to line 2 investments.
These are positive developments, however, the government still does not have an articulated debt
management strategy and it is not clear how the government plans to reduce existing debt service
obligations. PUTA continues to rely on central and local subsidies, along with short term debt, to meet its
current debt service requirements.
The Busan Transit Fare Structure Study, completed January 1997, focussed on developing a public
transport fare structure based on demand and cost conditions, rather than cost considerations alone. This
has provided the PCG a basis for adjusting tariff levels for the metro and bus transport to support increased
use of public transport. The City has taken on board reconmmendations to deepen bus-metro integration
through revenue sharing measures.
The Ministry of Transport and the Busan City Government financed and carried out training programs to
enhance staff experience in urban transport investment planning and programming at the national and local
levels through short- and long-term training courses, workshops, manuals and overseas training programs.
The government spent about $0.24 million on this component, much below the $1.92 mnillion estimated in
the SAR. No details with regard to the scope and subjects covered, nor the benefits or impact achieved
through these activities are available.
The provision of technical assistance to the Transportation Planning Division of Pusan City was-not
required as the city created, in 1995, the Busan Development Institute. This is a serni-autonomous body
which provides analytical support to the city government. The Transportation Planning Division, together
with the Busan Development Institute, has kept up the momentum on furthering developing TDMITSM
measures for congestion management.
4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:
The SAR presented the economic evaluation for investments under Component A - the Nopodong and
Tongnae modal integration facilities, and the East-West bus lane improvements. For Component B, the
investment in train cars, representing about 85% of total project costs, the Bank team reviewed the
economic evaluation completed by MOT. The two step system-wide analysis, followed by a detailed
analysis for each line and phase of construction, was found acceptable and a separate calculation was not
attempted. This analysis was also used as the basis for calculating the number of train cars required.
The justification for component A was based on user travel time savings and savings in vehicle operating
costs for subway-nders switching from private cars to the metro. The EIRRs for the modal interchange
facilities were 18% for Nopo and 19% for Tongnae. For the purpose of preparing this report, an economic
reevaluation of the modal integration facilities has been completed, following as closely as possible the
approach used during appraisal. The quantified benefits include mainly transfer-time savings for subway
riders using the improved entry /exit facilities, and reduced travel-times and travel costs for park-and-nde
users. The time savings for various users have been evaluated at unit rates estimated during appraisal. As
per capita regional incomes have increased over the last decade, the value of time is expected to have
increased; economic benefits are therefore likely to be higher than the returns reported here. It is expected
that the VOC savings used in the re-evaluation, based on appraisal estimates, understate such savings.
Vehicle operating costs are likely to have increased over the last decade due to higher average costs and
increased congestion. Higher than expected usage rates of the park and ride facilities are showing intemal
retums equal to or higher than the appraisal estimates, despite the conservative valuation of benefits. On
the cost side, the actual construction and operations and maintenance costs have been used in the
re-evaluation, and are lower than forecast in the SAR. The post-project EIRR's are 23 % for Nopo and
18.00% for Tongnae.
For the East-West bus lane, vehicle counts, modal shares and vehicle speeds are not available. Discussions
with bus drivers indicate improved speeds and continued occupancy rates. Since motorization rates in the
city have increased, the differential in bus speeds in the "with" and "without" scenarios is likely to be
higher. The resulting passenger time savings are thus expected to be higher than those cited in the SAR. It
is considered likely that the economic benefits of the investments in the East-West highway have been
realized. The project has also had a substantial demonstration effect in the introduction of TDM and TSM
measures in Busan. While these benefits are not quantified, it is expected that they would increase the
post-project EIRR.
4.4 Financial rate of return:
A financial rate of return was not calculated at appraisal and has not been calculated for this ICR. A
financial assessment of PUTA has been completed to evaluate the financial viability of the subway system
(See Annex 3b). Overall, PUTA's financial situation has deteriorated over 1994-2001. The
company has received constant cash injections from government to service debt and since 1998,
operating expenses. PUTA remains a high debt company (since 1997, total debt exceeds or is
equal to total assets), and about 75% of PUTA's debt has a maturity of 3 to 5 years. At the end
of 2001, it is estimated that PUTA's debt stood at W2,765 billion, in comparison to W1,394
billion at the end of 1993. About 80% of the outstanding debt is due to borrowing for
investments in Line 1. The capital structure for Lines 2 and 3 has, however, been corrected. 100%
of Line 3 investments are financed by the central and local governments and almost 80% of the
total capital financing for Line 2 is coming from government. Subway fares increases, exceeding
or in step with inflation, have been implemented over the project period.
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To improve PUTA's financial viability, PUTA's debt overhang from Line 1 needs to be
addressed. Scenario analysis shows that PUTA would be able to balance its income statement
from 2008, if 50% of its debt is converted to equity and fares increase annually by 8%. Removal
of Line 1 related debt from PUTA's books would allow the income statement to be balanced
earlier.
4.5 Institutional development impact:
While it is not always easy to identify how the Bank has influenced individual decisions about reforn at the
PCG and PUTA level, the overall impact of the Bank's involvement and the project has been very positive.
There has been a significant shift within PUTA and PCG from isolated supply-oriented measures to a more
balanced supply and demand-oriented perspective; although the practice of developing mode-specific
isolated solutions has been changing slowly. Important initiatives have been taken to plan, design and
construct a multi-modal and comprehensive urban transport system, and to treat investments and modal
policies in a more integrated fashion.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:
In 1997-98, Korea was affected by the Asian financial crisis accompanied by a rapid depreciation of its
currency. This event had a direct effect on income and employment levels for Busan, the patronage of the
metro and the actual financing of the project. The crisis contributed to lower than forecast ridership with
obvious consequences for operational cost recovery. In addition to tempering ridership growth
directly, the crisis appears to have impacted the completion of phase I, Line 2. This in turn
contributed to the lower than expected operational cost recovery. On the positive side, because the
contracts for purchase of metro cars were denominated in wons, the depreciation of the won against the US
dollar allowed more metro rail cars to be bought (See Section 5.4, Costs and Financing).
Table 6: Population and Vehicle (Forecast versus Actual) Growth
Characteristics Actual Forecast Forecast Actual
1991 1997 2001 2001
Population (million) 3.89 4.31 4 54 3.83
Employment (million) 1.61 1.81 1.97 1.654
Vehicle Population 346,400 579,200 813,200 810,000 [11
Car Population 213,500 360,900 509,100 550,000 [21
Unlinked Trips/person 1.64 1 82 1.96 1.83
Linked/Trips/person 1.48 1.61 1.71 1.63
Car/person (000) 54.9 83.7 112.1 143.6
Source Staff Appraisal Report Annex 15
[I] Estimate based on 760,693 vehicles in 1999
[2] Estmate based on 534,132 passenger cars in 1999
Trends in population growth and urban densities did not support ridership levels anticipated at appraisal.
A decline in the labor intensive shoe manufacturing sector and affiliated industries in 1995 led to an
unanticipated outflow of population (to Seoul or neighboring cities of Kimhae and Yangsan), while
immigration from rural and small towns to Busan petered out. Instead of increasing from 3.9 million to 4.5
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million over 1991-2001, as expected, the population of Busan actually decreased slightly to 3.8 million.
Though population levels remained more or less constant, population densities in the CBD have been
declining. The economically active population increased only about 2.5% from 1.61 million to 1.65 million
in a decade, and the overall number of daily trips increased about 11%, which is less than expected.
The growth of motorization has been much faster than in the past. Of the approximately 810,000 vehicles
in 2001, cars accounted for about 66 percent. The growth in household incomes (despite the financial
crisis) over the last decade, the growth of the Korean car industry, and a distortion of urban transport
prices in favor of cars has led to increased ownership and use of cars.
The financial crisis and the depreciation of the won affected Korea while procurement of the train cars was
under way. Since the contract for the cars was denominated in wons, and the component costs were cited
in US dollars, PUTA realized substantial dollar savings in this component. The savings were used to
purchase additional cars for the second phase of Line 2.
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control.
The most serious issue regarding PUTA's financial sustainability is its overall debt service level. Though
the government had agreed on the need for a long term plan to manage PUTA's debt and the Busan Urban
Subway Financing Study was completed, the central government has not yet adopted a plan to address this
issue. Addressing PUTA's debt related to Line 1 is critical before the intended transfer of PUTA's
ownership from MOT to PCG in 2007. Further, despite low ridership levels on Lines 1 and 2, the
Pusan subway expansion plans are continuing to be implemented in line with the national transport vision.
This has the potential to worsen PUTA's operational cost recovery in the future. On the positive side, the
government is providing 100% grant flmding for construction of Line 3, has increased its grant contribution
for Line 2 capital costs, and has provided operational subsidies to PUTA as needed.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
PUTA continues to perform well compared with similar mass transit authorities in the region and world
wide. It has improved its management practices and technical knowledge of transport demand management
and transport systems management, which in turn has had a positive impact on the achievement of the
project objectives and outcomes. Due to the unavailability of long term debt instruments, and inadequate
government financial assistance for existing debt, PUTA has had little choice but to contract additional
short term debt for servicing current liabilities and to fund part of the capital costs of Line 2. This has
weakened PUTA's financial position.
The lack of adequate Bus-metro service and fare integration is one of the factors impeding growth in metro
ridership. Progress towards increasing complementarity between the bus and subway system has been slow
although some measures, such as the Hanaro card usable interchangeably on buses and the metro, have
been implemented. During supervision, Bank aide-memoires underlined the need to speed up work on
inter-modal integration in view of the low ridership numbers. The PCG is now developing revenue sharing
measures and has committed to implementing these.
5.4 Costs andfinancing:
The overall project costs decreased by about 45 % (in US$ terms) during implementation. The major
source of savings was the lower unit costs of train cars from the bidding process and a further decline due
to the depreciation of the Won. The contracted cost per unit car was about 70% of the estimated amount.
After the Won's depreciation, the actual costs per car (in US$) were only 43% of the SAR estimate; the
savings were used to increase the size of this component. 15% savings were realized in the construction of
the Nopo inter-modal facilities while the civil works at Tongnae were 38% higher due to an expansion in
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the scope of work. Details on construction costs and funding sources are summarized in this section, with
supporting data provided m Annex 2.
Component A. Congestion Management.
The table below presents the sub-projects appraised, and includes investments identified in the 5-year
TDMITSM program study, and completed with loan proceeds and counterpart funds. Most of these
sub-projects were contracted and completed before 1997, and therefore were not affected by the financial
cnsis.
Table 7: Congestion Management Costs
SUB-PROJECT ACTUAL COSTS [11
(million Won) (thousand US$)
Transfer Facility & Parking Tongnae 11,594 14,492.5
Transfer Facility & Parking Nopo 9,371 11,713.8
Inter-city Bus Terminal in Nopo-dong 1,647 2,058.8
5-year Traffic Congestion Management Plan 709 886.3
Dongseo Bus-only lane on Chungyeol Road 147 183.8
TSM Gyodae Subway Station 16 20.0
TSM Hadan Subway Station 3 3.8
TOTAL 23,487 29,358.8
Source: Report on Completion of the Busan City Traffic Management Project (IBRD 3828-KO)
[I] Actual costs estimated using and average exchange rate of I US$ = 800 Won
The multi-modal integration facilities in Nopo and Tongnae were contracted and completed before 1997.
The total actual cost (US$11.7 million) of the civil works in Nopo were about 15% less than the SAR
estimate (US$13.8), while the total actual costs (US$14.5 million) of the works in Tongnae were 38% more
than the estimate (US$10.5). The latter increase in costs was due to an increase in the size of the parking
lot (273 spaces as compared to 175 spaces). About 32% of the total costs under these contracts were
financed with the loan proceeds, as originally envisaged.
Component B. Expansion of the Urban Transit System Capacity.
The contract to purchase the railway cars included a simulator, technical assistance, parts, tools, training
and VAT. Actual costs under this component changed significantly during implementation as the contract
for the train cars was signed in local currency and the won depreciated in 1997-98. The table below
provides relevant cost data.
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Table 8: Subway Cars Costs
Cost Type Source I# Cars Date Won 1*1 Exch. Rate US Dollars [*] Cost/Car $[II Estirnate SAR 310 15-Nov-94 200,256,000,000 800 250,320,000 807,484
_U Estimate SAR 310 15-Nov-94 197,616,000,000 800 247,020,000 796,839
[3] Estimate PUTA 336 26-May-95 173,971,357,500 766 227,265,000 676,384
[41 Contract 336 12-Dec-95 142,759,677,010 766 186,492,067 555,036[5] Actual 336 2-Nov-01 142,759,677,010 1232 115,834,056 344,744
6 Actual + Arbitration 336 15-Dec-99 162,759,677,010 1158 140,547,256 418,295
[e] Costs include cars, simulator, technical assistance, parts, tools and training, and VAT
[1] includes 10% tax, pncecontingencies 2 5%/o/year foreign and 50/o/year local
[2] costs exclude contingencies and include taxes
[3] Date assumed as the same as for Bid oppemng Used exchange rate same as contract.
[4] Contract price including taxes
[5] Data for the last disbursement is provided. Actual disbursement period cover Feb 1996 - Nov 2001.
Exchange rates vary from 780 to about 1,230 Won per US dollar.
[6] Actual Costs includes the Contractor Pnce adjustrnent request presented to the Korea Court of Arbitration
An increase on the price by W28 Billion (Dec. 99 Exch Rate $1=WI,133) was US$ equivalent 24,713,200
Component C. Institutional Development.
The actual cost of the studies was US$1.38 million (SAR = US$1.5 million). An average exchange rate of
US$1 = W 800 was used to account for the training (W 99,304) and technical assistance (W 99,043) to
obtain a total of US$240,000 financed by the implementing agencies, which is only about 13% of the
expected amount in the SAR (US$1,910,000).
6. Sustainability
6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:
The overall sustainability rating of "likely" applies to what the project was most successful in, which is to
have (i) expanded the capacity of the metro system, revised public parking policies, and introduced TDM
measures; (ii) successfully piloted mter-modal integration facilities at Nopo and Tongnae metro stations,
revised public parking policies, and introduced TDM measures; (iii) highlighted the need for and put
inter-modal planning firmly on the City's agenda, and (iv) framed PUTA's financial situation discussion in
terms of operational cost recovery and sustainability of its debt service.
Regarding the physical assets, it is certain that the new train cars and maintenance facilities have been
received by an organization with an established and excellent operations and maintenance culture. The
benefits of these investments, all things being equal, will continue over the life of these assets. PUTA has
been amongst the top two or three metros in the world in terms of its operational cost recovery; its
management is committed to containing costs and introducing measures to increase ridership. Extemal
factors and delays in completion of line 2 have had a large role in PUTA's failure to meet operational cost
recovery targets. Since 1997, however, the cost recovery ratio has increased every year. The City has
initiated bus-metro service and has developed an integrated ticketing system to encourage use of public
transport. The City is now reforming the fare system, to introduce differentiation by trip length, location
and time of day. Busan City has reached an agreement with Dongnam Bank for the financing of
infrastructure (computerized information base) needed for revenue sharing between diverse public transport
operators. Traffic demand management measures, such as "Voluntary Driving Restriction Day" and
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conversion of company parking lots into commercial lots, have become part of the city's transport agenda
and are being continually expanded. All these efforts are highly likely to increase overall ridership levels,
specially when combined with an urban transport fares policy responsive to demand and cost conditions.
This bodes well for PUTA's operational sustainability.
The issue of PUTA's high and mushrooming debt service has been somewhat mitigated by increases in
government contributions to Line 2 investments but overall PUTA's debt has continued to grow. Though a
revised debt management plan is not available, the government has committed to providing hundred percent
financing for Line 3. The government has also subsidized PUTA's operations, as needed. As long as PUTA
remains under central government ownership, the government takes responsibility for its liabilities. Before
PUTA reverts to PCG, its former owner, PUTA's balance sheet would need to be re-structured either
through early retirement of its debt or through removal of debt from the balance sheet.
6 2 Transition arrangement to regular operations
The project was implemented by a working metro authority and a City Government. Both organizations
are well in control of the various project components and no special transition arrangements are required.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank
7.1 Lending.
The Bank's performance in the preparation stage of the Project was Satisfactory The CAS and graduation
plan for Korea had identified the transport sector, in particular urban transport, as an area where the
Bank's expertise would be desirable, and the project was targeted accordingly. The design of the project
components was relatively straightforward, and well within the implementing capacity of the project
agencies. The Borrower's own experience in project development and past experience with Bank projects
meant little time was lost in moving from identification to appraisal and negotiations, all of which were
completed in 22 months. The Bank's appraisal was comprehensive. All aspects of individual components,
all of which were in an advanced stage of preparation, were addressed in detail. The inter-disciplinary
appraisal team was staffed with high level professionals, two urban transport specialists, a senior engineer,
a financial analyst, and an environmental specialist.
The strong commitment of the Government and the implementing agencies was correctly assessed,
including their commitment to institutional development, and allocation of resources and staff for
implementation. The Bank's safeguard policies were appropriately taken into account, including land
acquisition and resettlement, even though none of the proceeds of the loan were used to finance the civil
works for the construction of the subway lines. While the risks associated with the weak capital structure of
PUTA were correctly assessed, the appraisal team was perhaps optimistic as to what PUTA or PCG could
realistically do to address the structure of PUTA's debt. While PUTA was responsible for servicing its
debt and for preparing an annual debt management plan, the financial instruments available to PUTA for
long term borrowing and the level of Government subsidies available were areas where the Government had
de facto power.
Even though the size of the IBRD loan (US$ 100 million) accounted for less than about 7% of the estimated
construction costs for Phase I of Line 2 (about US$1,500 million), and less than 2% of the total estimated
construction costs of the entire subway system (Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3 US$6,000 million), the Borrower
highly appreciated the Bank's involvement and the project's contribution to the development of the public
transport system and introduction of TDM/TSM concepts to enhance the efficient use of public
transport and the road system in Busan.
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7.2 Supervision:
Bank staff performance during supervision was Satisfactory. After graduation, in view of the Client's
capacity for implementation, the Bank reduced its supervision efforts to one mission a year. The
spacing of supervision missions, approximately once a year, over the project's life was adequate. The
missions were adequately focused and provided sound professional guidance to the government. The
continuity of the task manager from preparation through supervision, with just one change during
supervision, provided consistency for both the Bank and the Borrower. The Bank's supervision missions
reviewed the Borrower's progress reports in detail, held discussions with the implementing agencies, and
followed up appropriately in action letters. Mission reporting in project status reports was sufficiently
detailed and gave realistic performance ratings. Proposed adjustments to the components were extensively
reviewed and discussed with the proposing agencies and internally prior to providing no objections.
Institutional and financial issues did not receive uniform attention from missions, and could have benefited
from a closer review. The Project correspondence indicated that Bank staff were constructive, flexible and
responsive to Client requests.
7.3 Overall Bankperformance:
Overall, the Bank performance during preparation and implementation was Satisfactory.
Borrower
7.4 Preparation:
The performance of the Borrower during the preparation stage was Satisfactory. With governent support
and consultant assistance, the implementing agencies prepared the project within 22 months of
identification. Technical reports and proposals were of high professional quality. The implementing
agencies were committed to the project and allocated adequate staff and resources to project formulation
and preparation.
7.S Government implementation performance:
The satisfactory performance and involvement of the MOT during preparation continued during
implementation. Further, the government has decentralized fare setting powers to the local
governments, it has increased the city's share in PUTA's capital, and the transfer of PUTA's
ownership from MOT to PCG in 2007, remains on track. Apart from support for the agreed
investments and procedures, the MOT and subsequently PCG, supported the cost recovery covenant
through fare increases in line with (and some greater than) inflation. The MOT's commitment to cost
recovery was stronger than its commitment to addressing the capital structure of PUTA. While the central
government has provided full grant funding for the expansion of the metro system (construction of line 3)
and increased its grant contribution to line 2 capital costs, it has not adequately addressed the issue of
PUTA's long term debt obligations. A debt management plan to reduce PUTA's outstanding debt and
associated debt service obligations is not available, and PUTA's debt service requirements have continued
to increase.
7.6 Implementing Agency:
The performance of both implementing agencies, PUTA and PCG, was Satisfactory. Procurement
procedures and contracts were handled with great care by the agencies. Both agencies successfully
implemented and supervised their respective components, mostly within the agreed costs, performance
parameters and the two year extension time frame. The noncompliance with the cost recovery covenant
resulted from a slower growth in metro passengers attributable to the financial crisis, slower population
growth, increased suburbanization and motorization, as well as a delay in completion of Line 2.
Semi-annual progress reports, environmental reports and annual audit reports were submitted to the Bank
in the required time and were of high quality. The Borrower's contributions to the Implementation
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Completion Report were submitted to the Bank on time as required.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance:
Overall, the Borrower's performance was Satisfactory.
8. Lessons Learned
The following lessons emerge from the implementation of this Urban Transport Management project.
Public Transport is essential to address congestion but not sufficient to control motorization. Both PT
capacity and access to PT are needed for optimal use of PT services. The project has been successful in
enhancing metro capacity and demonstrating the importance of integrated public transport services to
service usage. It has also effectively demonstrated the importance of demand management measures, such
as PT pricing and parking policies. However, availability of PT services is only one factor influencing
demand for automobiles. Income levels, car prices, and the relative costs of private vehicles use versus PT
use are some of the others. As long as total costs of car usage do not reflect their full social costs,
increasing the supply of PT alone is insufficient to deter growth in motorization levels.
Full operating cost recovery in metro systems is possible under the right conditions. The Pusan metro
is amongst the few metros worldwide which have the potential and are able to cover operating costs,
excluding depreciation of assets. For the most part, the difference in the level of cost recovery is
attributable to differences in revenues rather than costs. Both high fares and high levels of usage are
needed for operating cost coverage. Though fares were increased over the project period, it was the delays
in completion of both phases of Line 2, which led to under-achievement of the targeted 100% cost recovery
ratio (the target included asset depreciation and contributions to a replacement fund). Still, the Pusan
metro demonstrates that a well run metro system does not need its operational costs subsidized, provided
there is a high level of usage and the fares resonate with demand and cost conditions.
Building institutions is necessary for implementation of comprehensive transport management. Urban
transport integration and sustainability have significant institutional requirements. In the case of Pusan, the
Urban Transportation Planning Unit within the City Government, along with the Busan Development
Institute, established at the start of the project, have been responsible for coordinating the implementation
of the TDM/TSM measures both within and outside the project. At the same time PUTA was and continues
to be a very competent technical organization, and has been an important factor in the success of the
project. Without a good coordination between PCG and PUTA, it would have been difficult to pilot the
integrated transport management approach of the project.
Up-front initiatives taken by the Government contribute to successful project outcomes. The project
has shown that it is extremely useful to require that key reforms - at various decision-making levels - be
taken up-front as a clear demonstration of the Borrower's commitment. Examples of those are: (i) the rail
transit authority rationalized the subway fare policy to contribute to a self-sustaining operation; (ii) the city
government revised the public parking charges and investment policies to promote transit use while
inhibiting car use in congested areas; (iii) the Central government committed to decentralizing fare setting
powers to local governments, and (iv) the Korean Government put in place an effective and acceptable
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure and institutional framework to monitor all capital
projects, including urban transport infrastructure.
External factors are major determinants of project success or failure. We should never lose sight of
the fact that factors well beyond the scope of the project can be major determinants of the success or failure
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of project implementation and final outcomes. The financial crisis of 1997-98 impacted the city's
population growth, income levels, and more directly subway finances and start of operations of Line 2
which were delayed. Despite extensive attention to PUTA's financial health during project preparation, and
PUTA's continued excellent operational performance, the financial targets specified in the project could not
be fully met.
9. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
Part A is the contribution from PCG, and Part B from PUTA. Appendices 1 - 8 referenced below are
available in the ICR project files.
Part A.
Busan Metropolitan City Traffic Planning and Management Department
1. Introduction
The population of Busan was 1.36 million in 1963 when its status was raised to that of a metropolitan city
and it has showed continuous growth because of its rapid economic development - 3.16 million in the
1980's and 3.79 million in the 1990's. With the rapid population increase more systematic and effective
counterplans becarne necessary in order to provide its citizens with speedy and comfortable transportation
and to solve the traffic congestion problems. Therefore, the Busan Metropolitan City planned and
established a new traffic network system focusing on easy connections with neighboring cities and the
extension of trunk roads in 1972.
Busan has continuously tried to find ways to disperse the increased heavy traffic such as constructing the
frst city highway (completed on Oct. 7, 1980), subway line #1 (completed on June 23, 1994), and the
second city high way (completed on Dec. 28, 1994). However, Busan still had to face new problems such
as how to build a city traffic network that connected with the metropolitan traffic network, how to expand
the harbor support roads, how to increase the number of parking lots around some subway stations, and
how to easily transfer between bus and subway lines.
To solve these new problems Busan, due to its poor financial status in March 1995, obtained a loan for
US$100,000,000 from IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The Busan
Metropolitan City Goverrment budgeted US$17,500,000 for the purpose of establishing better transfer
facilities in order to induce its citizens to use the subway more frequently.
The balance of US$82,500,000 was to be distributed to the Busan Urban Transit Authority for the purpose
of purchasing subway trains. Busan city completed the transfer facilities project with only
US$9,568,621.72 by parring down expenses.
2. Purpose
The purpose of The Busan City Traffic Management Project was to provide the citizens of Busan with a
more comfortable and pleasant city life which included establishing transfer centers to improve the
efficiency of subway line 1.
3. Expansion
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The Busan Urban Transit Authority applied for a loan from IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development) to construct subway line #1 on March, 9, 1992. IBRD agreed to the loan only under the
condition that the Busan Urban Transit Authority would also plan a total inter-model system on May,
1992. An M.O.U. (Memorandum Of Understanding) between the Korean government and IBRD was made
on March, 3, 1995.
* Total loan amount: US$100,000,000
* Busan Metropolitan City's allotment: US$17,500,000
- Expenses budged for establishing transfer facilities and managing traffic congestion: US$16,000,000
- Expenses budged for purchasing traffic managing equipment: US$500,000
- Expenses budged for a 5-year traffic congestion management plan: US$ 1,000,000
* Busan Urban Transit Authority's allotment: US$82,500,000
* Expense Budget
Expense Budget Details
(Unit: US$10,000)
Total Busan
Name of the sub projects Etpense Metropolitan Remarks
City's allotment
Total 5 408 1,750
Sub Total 5,104 1,600
Traffic Establishing transfer facilities 2,798 878
Congestion Establishing Dongseo bus only lane 218 68
Management
Establishing 5-year traffic congestion 2,088 654
management plan ,
Traffic System Traffic Management project 192 50
Improvement
Professional Researching and developing
Development companies to carry out 5-year traffic 112 100
Companies congestion management plan
4. Performance
* The project was composed of five sub projects to 1.) build parking lots and transfer facilities at
Nopo-dong and Dongnae subway stops, 2.) build TSM, 3.) build a Dongseo bus only lane, 4.) develop
a 5-year traffic congestion management plan, and 5.) move the intercity bus terminal in Nopo-dong.
The biggest of the sub projects, building the parking lots and transfer facilities, was constructed by
Daeseong Construction Co. Ltd., Heungguk Construction Co. Ltd., and Saerim Landscape Co. Ltd.
and the constructional materials were purchased from supplying administration.
* No technical construction difficulties occurred due to the accumulated experience and know-how of the
three construction companies used to build the parking lots and transfer facilities.
* There was no significant increase in the number of passengers per day using the Nopo-dong station
after building the transfer facility and parking lot.
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- The number of passenger per day using the Nopo-dong subway station -
(Unit: people)
Name of the 1998 1999 2000 2001 Remarks
subway station I I I I I
Nopo-dong 4,210,992 4,5436,097 3,997,753 4,408,055
However, the number of passengers is predicted to increase gradually with the completion of the new bus
terminal which was expected to be a main factor for the success of this sub project.
O Sub projects details
(Unit: 1 million won)
Sub Project Outline Calculated Alloted Actual Status
Expense
0 Parking Lot
-Size:L=265m, B=9-59m,
A=12,7 10m2
Transfer facility and -One Toll House. A=50.57m2
parking lot in Nopo-dong 0 Transfer facility 9,371 2,999 2,999 completed
subway station -Size L=135m, B-7.3-33.3m,
A=3,699m2
-One additional
building
0 Parking Lot
-Size:L=100m, B=46.7-48.1m,
A=7,629m2
Transfer facility and 0 Transfer facility
parking lot in Dongnae -Size:L=172.3m, B=43.5-48.1m, 11,594 3,710 3,710 completed
subway station A= 11 ,678.5m2
-Wall:
H=34m, L=260m
H=6.5-7.5m, L=187m
5-year traffic congestion 709 709 709 completed
management plan
TSM Gyodae subway 16 5 5 completed
station
TSM Hadan subway 3 1 l completed
station
Dongseo bus only lane 147 47 47 completed
on Chungyeol road
The mtercity bus terminal 1,647 536 536 completed
in Nopo-dong
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* Utilization of Facilities and results of research and development
* The number of parking lot users in Nopo-dong and Dongnae
(Unit: 1 car)
Name of Parking Number of cars |
Subway station Capacity 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Nopo-dong 348 143,665 173,212 172,377 138,790 174,995
Dongnae 419 213,890 237,710 241,956 235,462 259,119
* Transfer Facilities
o Nopo-dong Station
- Present Status of Utilization: Record shows an even distribution usage of the facility.
- Plan: To continue to promote and manage the facility now that the new intercity bus termnal has
been built.
o Dongnae Station
- Present Status of Utilization:
1997 2002
No of bus No. of No. of bus No. of
Routes companies buses company buses Remarks
stopping at stopping at stopping at stopping at
Dongnae Dongnae Dongnae Dongnae
Daedong Hospital --> 12 136 32 416
Naeseong Intersection
Dongnae Rotary --> 3 29 3 32
Myeongryun-dong Subway Station
Dongnae Rotary --> 9 107 12 150
Gyeodae Subway Station _
Naeseong Intersection --> 19 273 18 233
Dacdong Hospital
Minam Rotary --> I 1 179 16 240
Dongnae Rotary
Gyeodae Subway Station -->8 96 9 117
Dongnae Rotary
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o Performance expected from the 5-year Traffic Congesdon Management Plan (TDMTSMI)
o Converting lanes to bus only lanes: 17 sections - totaling 78.14 km
Street Name Section Length Operating Remarks(km) hours
Jagalchi Road Chungmu Intersection --> 24 hours a one way
Nampo Police Station day
Myeongryun Road Suan Intersection --> 0.7 24 hours a one way
Myeongryun Elementary School day
Gudeok Road Old City Hall Intersection --> 07:00-09:00
Jalgachi Intersection 17:00-21:00
Geumjeong Police Station <--> 07:00-09:00
Jungang Road 17.77 two way
Old City Hall Intersection 17:00-21:00
Daeti Tunnel Entrance <--> 07:00-09:00
3 9 two way
Handan Intersection 17:00-21:00
Nakdong Road Gupo Overpass <--> 07:00-09 00
Nadkdong Gas Station 17:00-21:00
Chungyeol Roda Wondong Interchange <--> 4 8 07:00-09:00 two way
Minam Intersection 17:00-21:00
Mandeok Road
Gwangdeok Mulsan Co. Ltd. <--> 07.00-09:00
Deokcheon Rotary 1.8 17:00-21:00
KBS Three Way Intersection -->
3.8 07:00-09:00 two way
Suyeong Road Munhyeon Intersection
Munhyeon Intersection --> 3.8 17:00-21:00 two way
KBS Three Way Intersection
Geumjeong Police Station <--> 07400-09:00
Geurnjeong Road 4.8 . . two wayBusan Bus Terminal 17:00-21:00
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o Install watching cameras on bus only lanes: 16 cameras
Road Name No. Location Direction
In front of Korea Electnc Power Corporation Jungang-dong - Nopo-dong
in Bujeong-dong, Busanjin-gu
2 Next to KBS in Choryang-dong, Dong-gu Nopo-dong --> Jungang-dong
In front of Busanjm Railway Station
inJaho-og3ogg Jungang-dong --> Nopo-dongin Jwacheon-dong, Dong-gu
4 In front of Song Sang Hyeon's statue Nopo-dong --> Jungang-dong
in Yangjeong, Busanjin-gu
Jungang Road Across from the Oncheonjang Subway Stop Nopo-dong Jungang-dong
in Oncheon-dong, Dongnae-gu
In front of Busan Cable TV Broadcasting Bldg6 Nopo-dong Jungang-dong
in Oncheon-dong, Dongnae-gu
Across from the Busan Cable TV Broadcasting Jungang-dong - Nopo-dong
in Oncheon-dong, Dongnae-gu
8 In front of Yangjeong-3dong Police Station Jungang-dong - Nopo-dong
in Yangleong-dong Busanjin-gu
Suyeong Road 9 Above Daeyeong Hill Munhyeon Intersection -->
in Dacyeong-dong, Nam-gu KBS Three way intersection
In front of the Mibo Pharmacy Nopo-dong - Jungang-dong10 Np-og->Jnagdn
in Choryang-dong, Dong-gu
In front of the Busan Railway Station
Jungang Road 11 Jungang-dong --> Nopo-dong
in Choryang-dong, Dong-gu
Behind Furnmture Street12 .in Fwch undrg Stneeg Nopo-dong --> Jungang-dong
In Jwacheon-dong. Dong-gu
13In font of Hanil Gas Co. Daeti Tunnel --> Hadan Rotary
in Goijeong-dong, Saha-gu
14 In front of the Goijeong Market Pharmacy Hadan Rotary --> Daeti Tunnel
Nakdong Road: - in Goijeong-dong, Saha-gu
15 In front of the Goijeong4 Saemaeul Bank Daeti Tunnel --> Hadan Rotary
in Goijeong-dong, in Saha-gu
16 In front of the Goryeo Paint Co Hadan Rotary --> Daeti Tunnel
in Hadan-dong, Saha-gu I
* Operating Hours: the office-going hour (07:00-09:00), the closing hour (17:00-21:00), and on Saturday
(07:00-09:00)
* Strengthening Traffic Demand Management
The esssence of traffic demand management is to reduce the traffic volume, especially for passenger cars
which have low transportation efficiency and to convert those dnvers into public transportation users.
(1) Traffic Demand Management for Companies
* Benefits for the participating companies: Reduced taxes imposed on car owners.
* Main contents: Compulsory plan (converting company parking lots into toll parking lots) Additional
plan (compulsory restricted driving days, etc.)
* progress
- Dec. 1994: Revised the ordinance regarding city traffic management.
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- Oct. 1995: Held a public hearing to gather public opinion on traffic demand management.
- Jun. 1996: The ordinance regarding city traffic management was amended (decreasing the tax rate
for company owned cars).
- Jul. 1997: Held a public hearing for companies to gather public opinion on traffic demand
management.
- Jul. 31, 1999: Published a guide line for the utilization of traffic demand management.
- Oct. 2000: Participating companies were supervised and inspected by the Traffic Demand
Management Department.
(2) Voluntary Driving Restriction Day
o Outline
o Private car owners whose license plate's last number matches the last number of the day of the
month should not drive their car on that day from 7 am to 9 pm.
o Started March 1999 and excludes holidays and the 31st of the month.
O Revised the laws and ordinances to accomodate the restricted driving day program for private cars.
O Incentives and penalties
- Incentives: City highway toll exemption during the rush hours, 20% discount on an official
parking lot, etc.
- Penalties: Restricting parking in any official building, 20% additional charge for using an official
parking lot, etc.
o Plans
o To promote the use of car pools to increase the adoption of the voluntary restricted driving days
program.
o Select certain apartment complexes to monitor effectiveness of the carpool system.
O Modify and revise the incentives and penalties system.
(3) Public Transportation Day
o Outline
o Time: The first Monday of every month from Nov. 2000.
o Participation:
- Compulsory for all governmental officials.
- Voluntary participation for citizens.
O Promoting Public Transportation Day
o Holding advertising campaigns
- Advertising campaigns organized by each district office will be held on every Public
Transportation Day.
- Monthly advertising campaigns organized by Bus Unions and civic organizations.
o Promotions via the media
- Broadcasting on MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) radio station on Tuesdays and on
TBN (Traffic Broadcasting Network) on Thursdays.
- Voice announcements and notices on electronic marquees in every subway station.
o Plan
o Promotions in conjunction with the 2002 World Cup and the Asian Games.
O Plans for utilizing public transportation
(1) Hanaro Transportation Card
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* Background
o Dongnam Bank developed a cash card approved by the Ministry of Finance and Economy on Dec.
12, 2000.
o Busan Metropolitan City and Dongnam Bank agreed on building an infrastructure to accomodate
the use of the transportation card for all types of public transportation.
* Benefits
o To the citizens: makes using the public transportation system more convenient.
- No need to carry coins, tokens, or other boarding tickets.
- Discount fares for the subway and bus.
- Makes using all types of public transportation easier.
o To the transportation companies: Improved efficiency by computerizing revenues
- Improved management efficiency by having computerized income
- Increased passengers
- Improved relationship between labor and management by clarifying income.
o To the city government: improves traffic management by having more accurate and more timely
public transportation usage data
- Improved data for use in expansion plans for future traffic plans.
- Improved data for use in setting transportation fares.
o To the Korean government
- Reduces currency in circulation.
* Procedures
o Jul. 1995: Established a plan for creating the system
o Dec. 1995: Developed the organizational responsibilities for operating the system.
o Feb. 1996: A fundamental agreement on operational responsibilities was signed by 8 participating
organizations and companies.
o Mar. 1996: Selection of companies to develope the electronic accounting system.
- Subway and Bus: Gyeongdeok Electronics Co. Ltd.
- Taxi: KD Communication Co. Ltd.
o Aug. 1996: An agreement on how to operate the Hanaro Card system was signed.
o Sep. 1997: Partial implementation was begun.
- Subway line #1: 581 gates
- Bus lines: 507 buses
- Recharging outlets: 84 locations (50 in subway stations and 34 street locations)
o Feb. 1998: Full implementation was begun.
- Subway line #1: 581 gates in 34 stations
- Bus lines: 3,003 buses
o Jun. 1998: Partial implementation was begun for local area buses (84) and city highway toll gates
(6).
o Aug. 1998: Full implementation was begun for all local area buses (except for Gangseo and
Gijang) and all city highway toll gates.
o Jun. 1999: Full implementation was begun for subway line #2 (21 stations and 372 gates)
o Mar. 2001: Full implementation was begun for 4 tunnels
(Baekyang, Hwangyeong, Mandeok, and Gudeok totaling 36 gates)
o Aug. 2001: Expanded implementation for subway line #2 on 9 additional stations.
(2) Taxi Information Project (TIP)
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o Features: payment by credit cards and issuing of receipts, use of centralized five language translation
center, and improved call service.
o Use of the TIP system was begun by privately owned taxis in Feb. 2002 and corporately owned taxis
in July totaling 24,347 cars.
(3) Traffic information collecting system
o Outline: Provide traffic information to drivers
o Information: traffic reports and suggest altemative routes, direction infornation.
o Method: Intemet, ARS (Automatic Response System), Mobile phone, and highway and street
marquees.
5. The Bank's role
IBRD played a major role in the success of the project by financing the project and lending their expertise
in construction, technical and financial matters.
6. Project related organizations
a Traffic Planning and Management Department
The departnent took a major role as a organizer by planning the city traffic management project, the
budget, and detecting deficiencies and correcting them.
a Busan Metropolitan Police Agency
Provided full cooperation and assistance with Busan Metropolitan City regrading the traffic signal
systems and lane changing usage,
o Supervising Organization
Provided supervision on construction and testing the system.
7. The Role of the Busan Metropolitan City
The Busan Metropolitan City did everything possible to ensure the success of the project by providing all
the necessary data required. They held numberous meeting with reluctant companies to iron out any and all
problems as the project was being implemented. They also helped developed the various traffic
management policies. As a result of their efforts successful results are being seen in every aspect of the
project.
8. The Valuation of the Result
The results since the project has been completed have been very satisfactory to date.
9. Future Management
o Facilities and operation of the system.
o The efficiency in connecting between the subway system and the bus system will have to be
improved. Busan Facility Management Corporation, which is in charge of managing this, will have
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to make a greater effort to improve upon this system.
o The traffic flow has been improved in the city center as a result of moving the intercity bus
termninal. However, there is not a noticeable change in the number of passengers using the subway
system even after its removal. A greater effort to provide incentives to use the subway system such
as extending the hours of operation and reducing the fees for using the parking lots should be
considered.
o Traffic congestion has to be minimized by determning the traffic flow in the city at all times and
by determining better usage of lanes.
9. Partner Comments (Continued)
(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
Part B.
Pusan Urban Transit Authority Implementation Closing Report IBRD Loan 3828-KO, April 2002
1. Preface
* This loan contract was made between REPUBLIC OF KOREA (the Borrower)and
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT(the Bank) projects
to proceed clearly one of infrastructure building projects, "Pusan Urban Transport Management
Project" with the loan.
* The project is composed of PART (A), PART (B) and PART (C). Pusan City of Govermnent
performed PART (A) and PART (C), PUTA did PART (B).
* PART(B) was consisted with two to improve the growing traffic congestion and tighten the Pusan
Urban Transit System Capacity.
The first thing is PUTA's responsibility for the subway expansion (procuring subway 336 railcars).
The second one is to appoint consultants to conduct the Pusan Transit Fare Structure Study and the
study for the identification of the alternative long-term subway financing.
* PUTA received $82.5(mil.) to proceed the project all from IBRD Loan by subsidiary Loan Agreement
between Republic Of Korea and Pusan Urban Transit authority and finished the project. The project
was made from Feb. 1996 to Mar. 2002 for 6 years. PUTA now finishes it and hand out ICR to IBRD.
2. Project Purpose
* Under PART (B), the project's overall purpose is to initiate a multi-modal urban transport management
strategy in Pusan. That is, by opening Line 2 (Hopo - Somyon) reaching East and West, connected
with Line 1 reaching North and South in Pusan to expand transport capacity and increase the
proportion of total trips served by subway.
* In details, the first thing, is to receive IBRD Loan Funds for opening Line 2.
From the sensitivity analysis by IBRD, the result shows that PUTA can retain a healthy working ratio by
making relatively small changes in fares that are indexed to inflation and must receive additional cash from
the PCG or the Government. So, PUTA will implement the Transit Fare Structure Study and a study for
altemative long-term financing strategies.
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3. Project Status
o To proceed the project, PUTA abided by Procurement and Consultants Services written on the
Schedule of PUTA project Agreement.
o After a bid announcement Mar. 27. 1995, six companies participated the bid. Contracted with Hanjin
Heavy Industries Co./GEC Alsthom U.K. for the delivery of 336 railcars on Dec. 28. 1995 with
IBRD's approval amounting to 135.5 billion (excluding. VAT).
o The deliveries of 168 rail cars for Phase 1 were concluded on Dec. 2. 1998 from Jan. 5. 1998 with 10th
delivery. Phase 1 Line 2 (Hopo-Somyon)-22.4km opened on Jun. 30. 1999
o Partial section (Somyon-Geumnyeonsan) of Phase 2 Line 2 (Somyon-Jangsan.) opened on Aug. 8.
2001. The rest of Phase 2 Line 2 will open on August 2002. 168 railcars for Phase 2 finished the
delivery on Mar. 2002 with 18 railcars, indicating the end of deliveries-336 railcars.
o With approval of IBRD, PUTA's long-term financing strategy consultants services was made a
contract with The Korea Transport Institute, initiated the study cooperated technology with Arthur
Anderson and received final report on Sep. 1996 amounting to 357,600,000
o For the project, PUTA $420,187.29 was used for PUTA's financial study consultant services. The rest
$82,079,812.71 was used for procuring electric railcars and the deficit amount for railcars was fulfilled
with internal funds.
4. Project Objective/Achievement
(1) Objective
o Given the geographical constraints the project objective is 1) to expand the roads, to release
traffic-congestion and enlarge the overall capacity of the transport system in subway.
In addition, by increasing Internal Sources (Ticket Sales and Operating Revenue), 2)to meet the
working costs and vehicle depreciation.
O According to final report of Sunway Financing Study consultants Services, 3) to increase fares side by
side and expand subsidiary funds from the Government and PCG for overcoming the financial deficit
from 1996 - 2001.
(2) Achievement
o After opening of phase I Line 2 in 1999, subway transport capacity, ticket sales and the proportion of
total trips increased well compared to those of 1995's, original year of borrowing the Loan.
O Intemal Sources will meet the vehicle depreciation after opening the total Phase 2 Line 2 on August.
2002 because of anticipating hikes of them.
O PUTA receives Construction Cost from(the Government 50%, PCG 50%), prospects no additional
debt increases and 60°/o- 70% of interest payment for operating cost from the Government every year
(At first, promised 100% subsidy, currently receiving 60%, due to the budget lackness, anticipating
subsidy increase)
o PUTA's Debt Service Coverage increases, financial prospect is hopeful.
(Reference to Appendix 1-8 attached)
Note: Appendices 1 - 8 referenced are available in the ICR project files.
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o Subway tranport capacity status (OOOs/mil.)
Average Proportion
Riderships Total Average of total
Year (day) Riderships Revenue (day) Total trips (%) .
1995 586 213,799 198 72,150 8.7
1996 597 218,347 222 81,110 9.75
1997 598 218,307 234 85,386 9.8
1998 557 203,430 221 80,713 10.5
1999 664 224,254 266 89,413 11.9
2000 658 240,920 291 106,569 11.5
2001 711 250,238 355 124,963 12.6
o Subsidy from the Government and PCG (WlOOmil.)
Year Total Government PCG
Operation Construction
1995 2,980 1 900 1,125 955
1996 4,120 1,301 1,610 1,209
1997 3,562 1,521 1,397 644
1998 3,855 1,335 1,306 1,214
1999 4,564 1,419 1,287 1,858
2000 5,714 1,503 1,967 2,268
2001 5,466 1,196 2,109 2,161
* In environment side, PUTA tries to below the minimum level of air pollution in station in Lme I and
underground tunnels. For those efforts, we do our best to improve air handlmg filter purifying system,
install main line sprinkler equipment, remodel feeding tower, clean ventilating duct.
* In Line 2 and Line 3, also the survey is performed for Air, Water, NoiseNibration every year.
5. Role of The Bank
* Every year the mission team visited to KOREA to check the project status, technical matters,
requirements agreed between PUTA and IBRD by the Bank's supervision schedule.
* Approval just in time from IBRD for withdrawal application led to proceed the project without matters.
6. Role of PUTA
* PUITA implemented the project clearly with observance of the agreements between PUTA and the Bank
and advises from the Bank, handed out the project execution status, financial forecast, EX POST
FACTO REPORT ENVIRONMENT SURVEY. PUTA made an end to the subway financial study
and makes great efforts to improve financial viability.
7. Evaluation
* PUTA is greatly satisfied with the well-performed project and the Bank's cooperation without any
problem.
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(b) Cofinanciers
Not applicable.
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
Not applicable.
10. Additional Information
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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome / Impact Indicators:
Indicator/Matrix * . ' '~ 2ProJectedinlastPSR-L - Actual/Latest Estirmate-1
PUSAN CITY GOVERNMENT [Calculated based on 280 days/year]
Modal Integration
-Vehicles/parking space/day at Nopo 1997 0 9 veh/sp/day 1997 1.47 veh/sp/day
1999.0 9 veh/sp/day 1999 1 77 veh/sp/day
2001 1 80 veh/sp/day
-Vehicles/parking space/day at Tongnae 1997 1 6 veh/sp/day 1997 1 82 veh/sp/day
1999 2 2 veh/sp/day 1999 2 06 veh/sp/day
2001 2.21 veh/sp/day
PUTA OPERATIONS Year Total Year Total
- Total annual ndership 1995 230 22 1995 213 80
[million passengers] 1996 232 77 1996 218 35
1997 241.39 1997 218.31
1998 33542 1998 203.43
1999 441 17 1999 224 25
2000 446 38 2000 240 92
2001 528.91 2001 250.24
AVERAGE DAILY BOARDINGS Year Peak Daily Year Peak Daily
Nopo Stabon 1993 950 11,230
[closed unbl May 97 for construction of the 1997 1,325 15,654 1997 714 11,360
modal integrabon facility] 2001 1,535 18,100 2001 1,454 14,038
Tongnae Stabon 1993 4,030 21,630
1997 5,615 30,140 1997 2,795 27,754
2001 6,500 34,820 2001 4,103 27,660
PUTA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE YEAR YEAR
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
- Operabons Revenue [million Won] 180,854 200,769 236,566 96,173 116,834 138,603
- Operabons Expenses [million Won] 203,332 216,476 269,588 182,172 184,161 206,003
- Working Rato 742% 72 1% 676% 125.7% 1093% 1050%
- Operabng Ratio 1124% 107.8% 114.0% 1894% 157.6% 148 6%
- Recovery of Working Costs and
Depreciabonof RollingStock 1161% 1189% 122.1% 735% 844% 876%
- Rate of Retum on Net Fixed Assets -1 3% -0 9% -1.2% -1 9% -5 2% -4 3%
- Debt Sevce Coverage Ratio 1 01 1 00 0.98 1.39 1 28 1 13
Output Indicators:
| . .^ Indicator/lUatnx -, . -. ' ,' Projected In last PSR , Actual/Latest Estimate
Number of subway cars purchased using 310 in total 336 subway cars for Une 2
loan proceeds 52 for Une 1 and 258 for Line 2
Construcbon of Transfer Facility and Parking In Tongnae Completed
Lots In Nopo Completed
Implementabon of additional TSM measures TSM Gyodae Subway Stabon Completed
TSM Hadan Subway Stabon Completed
Construction of inter-city bus terminal In Nopo-dong Completed
Convertng lanes to bus-only lane One (1) section 4 7 Km on Chungyeol Road Seventeen (17) Secbons for a total of 78 1
km [2 4 one way and 75 7 km two way]
Contract and implementabon of three studies Pusan Urban Transit Fare Structure Study Completed
5-year TDM/TSM Program Study Completed
Long-term Financing Strategies for Subway Completed
Projects in Pusan
End of project
The figures presented as Projected in last PSR are found in the Staff Appraisal Report, November 1994.
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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal Actu IILatet Percentage of
Estimate 
--.Estimate Appraisal.
_Component 
- US$ million -US$ million
Component A. Congestion Management 36.30 29.36
Component B. Expansion of Urban Transit System 247.00 171.03
Capacity - Subway Cars
Component C. Institutional Development
Studies 1.50 1.38
Training 1.80 0.12
Technical Assistance 0.10 0.12
Total Baseline Cost 286.70 202.01
Physical Contingencies 6.60
Price Contingencies 39.10
Total Project Costs 332.40 202.01
Total Financing Required 332.40 202.01
Total Project Costs by Component excluding taxes estimated at US$32.9 million equivalent. The actual
costs presented in the table include contingencies.
Project Costs by Procureme t Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
1G -B E- IProcurement Method' N.13F. Total ost
_ 
_.enditure g _ 7 NCB- - Othoer .
1. Works 0.00 51.00 0.00 0.00 51.00
(0.00) (16.00) (0.00) (0.00) (16.00)
2. Goods 250.30 1.95 0.00 58.70 310.95
(82.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (82.50)
3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.50 1.91 3.41
(0.00) (0.00) (1.50) (0.00) (1.50)
Total 250.30 52.95 1.50 60.61 365.36
(82.00) (16.50) (1.50) (0.00) (100.00)
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements include taxes and duties.
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement- Method
-Expenditure,Category Ic a 
- .N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works 0.00 29.36 0.00 31.80 61.16
(0.00) (8.94) (0.00) (0.00) (8.94)
2. Goods 115.83 0.00 0.00 23.40 139.23
(82.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (82.08)
3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.38 0.24 1.62
(0.00) (0.00) (1.05) (0.00) (1.05)
Total 115.83 29.36 1.38 55.44 202.01
(82.08) (8.94) (1.05) (0.00) (92.07)
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A total amount of $7,931,005.09 was cancelled from the Loan.
"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies
2
'Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff
of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)
managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.
Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Component kPoiraisal.Estinmate:,- > i Actuia La6tetEsti m t .:.. l..- 
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ak I, 
Copoen A-BankaLEstma, Govt . CoF. .-- Bank, w Govt.' :. CoF. Bank Govt. -CoF.
A: Congestion 16.50 36.42 8 94 20.42 54.2 56.1
Management
B: Pusan Urban Transit 82.00 227.02 82.08 88.95 100.1 39.2
System Capacity Expansion
C: Institutional 1.50 1.91 1.05 0.57 70.0 29.8
Development
TOTAL 100.00 265.35 92.07 109.95 92.1 41.4
CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT PLAN - LINE 2
Description Unit Total Cost Total Cost [ll Percentage of(in Billion Won) (in million US$) Total
Planning, Design & Inspection 1 Global 51.7 64.63 2.4%
Land Purchase & Compensation 379,058 m2 76.6 95.75 3.6%
Engineering Work 39.1 km 1,315.6 1,644.50 61.1%
Station Construction 37 stations 144.5 180.63 6.7%
Track Construction 112.16 km 58 5 73.13 2.7%
Electrics Construction 39.1 km 97.6 122.00 4.5%
Signal Equip. Construction 39.1 km 48.1 60.13 2.2%
Communications Facilities Const. 39.1 km 71.1 88.88 3.3%
Ventilation Facilities Construction 36.8 km 80.8 101.00 3.8%
Testing & Factory Facilities Const. I Global 15.3 19.13 0.7%
Car Purchase 336 cars 145 1 181.38 6.7%
Miscelaneous Expenses I Global 48.0 60.00 2.2%
Total 2,152.9 2,691.1 100%
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CONSTRUCTION FINANCING PLAN - LINE 2 [39.1 km]
Description ~ Total Cost I Total Coist [1 ecntgJf oa
Descripffon | (in Billion Won) (in million US$) PercentageofTotal
Government Assistance 600.1 750.13 27.9%
Government Loans 113.5 141.88 5.3%
Pusan City Assistance 400.1 500.13 18.6%
IBRD Loan 63.6 79.50 3.0%
Loans 823 1,028.75 38.2%
Development Profit 152.6 190.75 7.1%
Total 2,152.9 2,691.13 100%
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING PLAN - LINE 2 Ext. (Yangsan Line) [7.9 kml
Description | Total Cost J Total Cost Ill Percentage of Total(in Billion Won) (in million US$)
PUTA 30.1 37.63 14.5%
Korea Land Authority 178.2 222.75 85.5%
Total 208.3 j 260.38 100%
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING PLAN - LINE 3 [29.5 km]
Description Total Cost Total Cost [11] [Percentage of Total
Description_______________ | (in Billion Won) (in million US$)
Govermuent Assistance 421.6 527.00 30.0%
Pusan City Assistance 421.6 527.00 30.0%
Loans 562.1 702.63 40.0%
Total 1405.3 1,756.63 100%
11] Exchange Rate October 1996 US$ S = 800
Source: Pusan Urban Subway Financing Study Final Report, Arthur Andersen (Korea Office), October 1996.
- 36 -
Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits
Annex 3.a
ECONOMIC EVALUATION
The following table provide the assumptions and results of economic evaluation for Component A
investments in the Nopodong and Tongnae inter-modal facilities: Table I for Nopodong improvements, and
Table 2 for investments in Tongnae. Table 3 shows the history of metro fare increases.
The EIRR for the East-West bus lane improvements has not been calculated for this report. However,
reported changes in vehicle speeds along this corridor are in line with appraisal estimates, and benefits in
terms of savings in travel time and vehicle operating costs are likely to have been achieved.
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Table 1: Economic evaluation of Nopo-dong inter-modal facilities
Costs (million Won) Benefits (million Won)
Year Cons- P&R Lot Total PV of Time VOC Time savings Time Total PV of
truction O&M costs total savings by savings by by bus savings by bus benefits total
costs costs costs P&R users P&R users bay users layover users benefits
II 1995 3,131.8 3,131.8 3,131.8 0.0 0.0
ij 1996 5,302.1 5,302.1 4,734.0 0.0 0.0
1997 200.0 200.0 159.4 549.5 1,010.1 80.8 133.5 1,773.8 1,414.1
1998 200.0 200.0 142.4 788.4 1,277.0 83.4 152.1 2,301 0 1,637.8
1999 200.0 200.0 127.1 928 9 1,325.2 86.2 175.6 2,515.8 1,598.9
[71 2000 200.0 200.0 113.5 857.4 1,096.8 89.1 207.3 2,250 6 1,277.0
2001 200.0 200.0 101 3 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577 9 1,306.1
2002 200.0 200.0 90.5 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 1,166.1
2003 200.0 200.0 80.8 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 1,041 2
2004 200.0 200.0 72.1 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 929.6
2005 200.0 200.0 64.4 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 830.0
2006 200.0 200.0 57.5 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 741.1
2007 200.0 200.0 51.3 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 661.7
2008 200 0 200.0 45.8 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 590.8
2009 200.0 200.0 40.9 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 527.5
2010 200.0 200.0 36.5 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 471.0
2011 200.0 200.0 32.6 1,045.1 1,195.5 92 0 245.3 2,577.9 420.5
2012 200.0 200.0 29.1 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 375.5
2013 200 0 200 0 26.0 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577 9 335 2
2014 200.0 200.0 23.2 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 299.3
2015 200.0 200 0 20.7 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 267.2
2016 200.0 200.0 18.5 1,045.1 1,195.5 92.0 245.3 2,577.9 238.6
TOTAL 8,433.9 4,000.0 12,433.9 9,199.6 19,846.4 23,837.11 1,811.5 4,593.3 50,088.3 16,129.3
II] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Assumptions:
[I] The economuc costs of construction are estimated at 90OV of actual costs- 9,371 million Won Discount rate = 12%
[2] The effectve subway speed - 26 kin/h NPV = 6,929.6
[3] Number of travel days per year 280 B/C = 1.75
[4] Average one way distance travelled by car = 24.3 kin IRR = 23.00%
[5] Value of time - 2,058 won/hr
[61 VebicleOperatingCost 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 -2016
Speed k Ion/hr 142 131 1 2 | 11.1 | 102
VOC won/veh-km 1451 151 5 1581 163 1 1683
Average Occupancy P&R 147 i 78 177 i 42 180
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Table 2: Economic Evaluation of Tongnae Inter-modal Facility
Costs (million Won) Benefits_(million Won)
Ye Cons- O&M Total PV of T.me VOC Trawser tone Loss of Transfea tom Transfn ume Transfer Transfer Total PV of
trtctcion COStS costs total savtngs savings avowis by utne by savmgs by -svtp by amn osem benefits benefits
costs costs by P&R by P&R south of non-sub- north of south of vaips by savmgs
users users ohugnyol Bnd way uses Churynyol B Chutnoyol B pedestaias by bicycle
(W-E) users south side (E-W) usen (S-E) uesm ovemwos ues
[I] 1995 5,234 5,234 5,234 0 0
[1] 1996 5,201 5,201 4,643 0 0
1997 231 231 184 534 981 89 -153 179 62 133 21 1,846 1,471
1998 231 231 164 705 1,143 92 -152 186 65 138 21 2,198 1,564
1999 231 231 147 848 1,210 96 -151 193 67 144 21 2,427 1,543
2000 231 231 131 952 1,218 99 -150 201 70 149 21 2,560 1,452
2001 231 231 117 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 1,277
2002 231 231 104 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 1,140
2003 231 231 93 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 1,018
2004 231 231 83 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 909
2005 231 231 74 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 811
2006 231 231 66 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 724
2007 231 231 59 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 647
2008 231 231 53 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 578
2009 231 231 47 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 516
2010 231 231 42 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 460
2011 231 231 38 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 411
2012 231 231 34 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 367
2013 231 231 30 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 328
2014 231 231 27 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 293
2015 231 231 24 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 261
2016 231 231 21 984 1,125 103 -148 208 72 155 21 2,520 233
Total 10,435 4,620 15,055 11,418 18,781 22,558 2,023 -2,977 4,094 1,416 3,043 416 49,354 16,004
[P] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [7] [7] [7] [7] (7]
Assumptions:
[I] The economuc cost ame sbtnated at 90% ofthe actual financial actual cost of construction -.11,594 miullion Won
[2] The effective subway speed - 26 km/h Discount rate = 12%
[3] Number of travel days per year - 280 NPV = 4,586
[4] Average one way distance travelled by car = 24 3 km B/C= 1.40
[5] Value of tune = 2,058 won/hr IRR= 18.1%
[6] Vehicle Operatng Cost | 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 -20161
Speed ke/mhr 142 131 120 i11 102
tVOC won/veh-kms 145 1 151 5 1581 163.1 168 3
Average Occupancy P&R 1 82 2 03 2 06 2 01 2 21
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Table 3: History of Metro Fare Increases
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Nominal fares I section 350 400 400 450 450 500 600 600
2 sections 400 450 450 500 500 600 700 700
Real fares: I section 375 400 385 420 400 453 550 543
2 sections 428 450 433 467 444 544 642 633
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Annex 3.b
Part I FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF PUTA
Preface
1. The financial analysis, similar to the SAR, will be focused on the consolidated financial conditions
of PUTA which constitutes over 85% of the total project cost. The methodology used in the ICR will also
be similar to that employed in the SAR. At present, PUTA has two operating subway lines (Lme I and
Line 2) and one line (Line 3) under construction. Line 1 (32.5 km) was completed in June 1994; Line 2-
the project line (phases I and II, 39.1km), was put into partial operation in June 1999 and completed in
September 2002; and Line 3 (29.5 km) which is under construction, is scheduled for partial operation in
December 2005 and completion in December 2007.
2. The financial evaluation of the project is comprised of two parts. Part I is the overall financial
evaluation of PUTA and Part II is the calculation of the FIRR and NPV of Line 2 (the project line),
including sensitivity analysis, probabilistic risk analysis and scenarios analysis. The financial cost of the
project was calculated on the basis of the weighted average cost of the various sources of funds. The
weighted average financial cost of the capital is estimated to be 5.14% (72.8% from the Bank at 5.0% and
27.2% from domestic funds at 5.5%).
PART I: FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF PUTA
3. PUTA was established in 1994. Invested by the Ministry of Construction and Transportation
(MOT), this state owned company was formed for the construction and operation of PUTA. The
evaluation will be focused on the consolidated financial statements of the company. The main revenue of
the company is the fare income and the fare is strictly regulated by the Pusan City Government (PCG).
4. Based on the current practice, the major financial operation features of the company can be
summarized below:
(a) A high debt company. MOT is the sole owner of the PUTA. The company needs a constant
extemal cash injection each year to full fill its cash shortages which results mamly from operating losses,
the capital investment and the financial obligations.
(b) The Rule of the PCG: Starting 1998, the PCG and MOT share equally the capital investment of
the PUTA. The PCG does not own the PUTA but can decide the fare of the PUTA, as well as its key
personnel appointments and the development plan.
(c) The Low Fare Policy: The PCG is adopting the low fare policy to the subway users. The current
operating revenues of PUTA is barely be able to cover its operating expenses.
(d) The Debts Structure: Most of the PUTA's debts are inherited from the borrowings for the
construction of Line 1. And, it is estimated that three quarters (75%) of the total debts are either short or
medium terms (the maturities are 3-5 years). This borrowing structure generates the cash pressure on
PUTA's daily operations.
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The fimancial Objective and the Fare
5. The main purpose of the operating revenue is to meet the minimum financial requirements for
operation, instead of maximizing the financial rate of return on the capital investment. The actual basic
subway fare, during the project's implementation period (1994-2001), has increased from 350 Won to 600
Won (or average 8.0% pa). For the long-term fare growth forecast, it is assumed that the fare will grow by
6.0% pa.
Traffic
6. The actual passenger traffic growth from 1994 - 1997, compared with the SAR' forecast, was in
the acceptable range. The variation of the actual traffic growth rate was less than 10% of the forecasted
figures made at the time of the appraisal. The Asia economic crisis in 1997-98, in which Korea was one of
countries that was hit the hardest in the region, caused the large decrease in traffic demand. In 1998, for
example, the total traffic was 203.3 million, which is similar to the 1993 data (203.7 million), backwards
by five years. The traffic then slowly grew back from 1998 to 2001, by about 7.1%. pa. The Crisis
caused a lower traffic growth rate from 1994-2001 (3.6% pa), compared with 14.2% pa forecasted in the
ICR. And the overall traffic volume in 2001 was only about half of the SAR's estimate.
PUTA: Tra ic_Com arison (million zssen r)
Growth pa
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (1994-2001)
The SAR (a) 208.74 230.22 232.77 241.39 335.42 441.47 446.38 528.91 -
Annual growth 2.5% 10.3% 1.1% 3.7% 39.0% 31.6% 1.1% 18.5% 14.2%
The ICR (actual) (b) 195.64 213.89 217.91 218.27 203.31 242.36 240.17 250.03 -
Annual growth -4.1% 9.3% 1.9% 0.2% -6.9% 19.2% -0.9%%. 4.1% 3.6%
(b) / (a) 93.7% 92.9% 93.6% 90.4% 60.6% 54.90/6 53.8% 47 3%
7. In terms of the long term traffic forecast, the annual growth rate for the completed lines (Line 1
and Line 2) is expected to be 2% pa. It is expected that the opening of the Line 3 in 2006 will add 30.66
million passengers in that year, 118.63 million in 2007, 160.32 million in 2008 and grow 2% pa thereafter.
In the SAR, construction of Line 3 was not taken into account for the traffic forecast. For comparison of
the traffic forecast between the ICR and the SAR, Line 3 traffic has been excluded. Without the Line 3
traffic, the revised traffic growth rate between 1994 - 2007 (the latest available year in the SAR) is
expected to be 4.1 % pa, compared with 9.4% pa assumed in the SAR. And, the revised traffic volume for
2002 - 2007 is about 50% less than the SAR's forecast. Summarized as follows:
PUTA: Traffl Comparison (on passenger)
Growth pa
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1994-2007)
The SAR (a) 600.29 620.08 624.40 645.00 649.51 670.94
Annual growth 13.5% 3.3% 0.7% 3.3% 0.7% 3.3% 9.4%
The ICR (b)/_l 282.50 304.78 310.87 317.09 323.43 329.90 -
Annual growth 13.0% 7.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 4.1%
(b) / (a) 47.1% 49.2% 49 8% 49.2% 49.8% 49.2% --
I_1: Exclude the Line 3 traffic.
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Financial Project Cost
8. The actual total capital investment for the PUTA is Won 139,784 million, which is only 56.5% of
the SAR's estimation (Won 247,616 million).
PUTA: Total Project Cost (Won million)
The SAR The ICR ICR/SAR
247,616 139,784 56.5%
Past and Present Financial Performance
9. The revised consolidated income statement for the PUTA is presented in Table 1. The salient
points of the results for the last three.years' actual performance (1999-2001), in comparison with the SAR,
appear on the following table:
PUTA: Income Statement Comparison (1999-2001)
1999 2000 2001
The ICR The SAR The ICR The SAR The ICR The SAR
Passenger traffic C000) 224,254 441,471 240,920 446,383 250,238 528,912
Total operating revenue (W million) 96,173 180,854 116,834 200,769 138,603 236,566
Total operating expenses (W million) 182,172 203,332 184,161 216,476 206,003 269,588
Other expenses (net) (W million) (50,037) 239,873 39,745 281,543 30,742 313,382
Net cash surplus (loss) (W million) (35.962) (262351 (107.072) (297.250) (98.142) (346.404)
Working Ratio 125 7% 74 2% 109.3% 72.1% 105 0% 67.6%
OperatingRatio 189.4% 112.4% 1576% 107.8% 148.6% 114.00/o
Rate of Return on Net Fixed Assets -1.9% -1.3% -5.2% -09% -4.3% -12%
10. All major financial ratios (working ratio, operating ratio and rate of return on net fixed assets)
show a deteriorated situation which results mainly from the lower than the expected traffic volume and
operating revenues. From 1999 - 2001, for an example, the actual traffic and revenue of PUTA constituted
less than 60% of the SAR's estimates.
PUTA: Traffic and Revenue Comparison (1999 - 2001)
1999 2000 2001
Passenger Traffic (million) The ICR (a) 242 36 240.17 250.03
The SAR (b) 441 47 446.38 528.91
(a) / (b) 54.9% 53.8% 47.3%
Operating Revenue (W billion) The ICR (c) 96.17 116.83 138.60
The SAR (d) 180.85 200.77 236.57
(c) / (d) 53.2% 58.2% 58.6%
Operating Gam (Loss) (W billion) The ICR (e) (35.96) (107.07) (98.14)
The SAR (f) (262.35) (297.25) (346.40)
(e)/(f) 13.7% 36.0% 28.3%
11. Despite the lower traffic demand, the total operating loss of PUTA was in much better condition
than the SAR' forecast. Based on the actual data, the total net cash loss for 1999-2001 constituted only
13.7%, 36.0% and 28.3%, respectively, of the forecasted amount in the SAR. The main reasons were: (a)
the higher growth rate on the unit operating revenue, and (b) the lower unit operating expenses. This is
explained as follows:
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12. Unit Operating Revenue: From 1994 to 2001, the actual unit operating revenue grew from 347
Won / passenger to 555 Won / passenger or 6.9% pa. This growth rate is faster than 4.0% pa forecasted in
the SAR. In 2001, the actual unit operating revenue was 23.9% higher than the SAR's forecast (554 Won
/ passenger vs. 447 Won / passenger).
PUTA: Unit Operating Revenue Comparison (Eon/ passenger)
Growth pa
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (1994-2001)
The SAR (a) 339 341 377 375 406 410 450 447 4.0%
The ICR (b) 346 374 416 441 431 397 487 555 6.9%
(b)/(a) 2.1% 9.7% 10.4% 17.7% 6.1% -3.1% 8.2% 23.9% -
13. Unit Operating Expenses: The total operating expenses were much less than expected. In the
SAR, the unit operating expenses were assumed at very high starting figures, but maintained almost a
constant figure from 1994-2001. The actual growth rate for the unit operating expenses was 9.2%.
Despite the fast growth rate, the actual unit operating expenses are still lower than the SAR's forecast. In
2001, the actual unit operating expenses were 6.6% lower than the SAR's forecast.
PUTA: Unit Operating Expenses Comparison Won/ passenger)
Growth pa
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (1994-2001)
The SAR (c) 895 922 998 994 996 889 927 878 -0.3%
The ICR (d) 446 481 539 493 621 752 767 824 9.2%
(c)/(d) 100.7% 91.7% 85.2% 101.6% 60.4% 18.2% 20.9% 6.6% -
14. Section 4.03 of the Project Agreement 1 states that, starting December 31 1995, total annual
operating revenue of the PUTA should be equivalent to and not less than the total operating expenses. In
the actuality, except for 1998, the PUTA has not met this requirement during 1995-2001. The low fare
policy and the low traffic demand have not seriously affected the daily operations of the company because
of the large government subsidies that have been injected to the company every year. In 2001, for example,
the total amount of the government subsidies to the PUTA was Won 461.8 billion or 3.3 times the PUTA's
total annual operating revenue. The actual subsidy level largely exceeded the SAR's projection of Won
132.2 billion or 56% of total operating revenue for 2001. In the long-term, without changing the current
operating styles, PUTA can only survive if the large amount of the government subsidies continues to flow
to the company every year. (Table 2: Sources and Applications of Funds).
15. Starting 1997, the total debt (long term plus current) of PUTA exceeded or was very close to its
total assets. Further, the ratio of current liabilities (the maturities of less than one year) to the total debt
has increased from 16.6% in 1995 to 30.4% in 2001. Although the equity was improved in 2001, it is
expected that it will tum negative in 2002 and maintain the negative status almost throughout the project's
life. The negative equity status makes the financial leverage of the company simply nonexistent, and it may
not be able to relieve it's severe solvency problems until 2008 (current ratio, the soundness of liquidity
which should be at least greater than 1.0). The detailed balance sheet is presented in Table 3 and
sununarized for 1999-2001 (actual) as follows:
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PUTA: Balance Sheet (Won million)
1999 2000 2001
ASSETS
Fixed assets (net value) 1,894,483 2,064,511 2,292,866
Current assets 108,750 77,819 57,535
Other assets 448,939 437,762 427,878
Total 2.452.172 2.580.092 . 2.778.279
LIABILITIES & EOQITY.
Equity (52,617) (27,690) 13,634
Long-term debts 1,883,734 1,833,011 1,924,312
Current liabilities 621,055 774,771 840,333
Other liabilities
Total 2.452.172 2.5800.92 2,7782279
Current ratio 0.18 0.10 0.07
Debt/ (debt + equity) ratio 102/-2 101/-1 100/0
/_LI: In the SAR, there is no balance sheet statement.
Future Financial Performance
16. To forecast the future financial condition, the consolidated financial statements have been prepared
(Tables 1, 2, and 3). The financial statements were prepared on the basis of the SAR's format and
incorporated with the current practice. The operating expenses of PUTA can be categorized as: working
cost (a. labor, b. material and supplies, c. power and d. others), and operating expenses (working cost +
depreciation). All other expenses, e.g., non operating income and expenses, interest payments and others,
are also included in the calculation of the profitability of PUTA. The major financial assumptions are in
Table 4. -
17. Based on it's current practice, the PUTA would not be able to balance its income statement over
the life of the project. Due to the heavy government subsidies, PUTA will probably not have difficulty
managing its cash flow. However, the company will not have any financial leverage over the project's life
and will be constantly facing solvency problems until 2008 due to the poor profitability. In addition, the
future financial performnance of PUTA is determined by the improvement of the following three major
factors.
18. Working Cost: Cutting working costs is one of the important steps to improve the profitability of
the operation. In 2001, for an example, total unit working costs (582 Won / passenger) exceeded the total
unit operation revenue (555 Won / passenger). This means, on average, that each passenger was receiving
27 Won of subsidy wlen they used the subway system (unit profits was estimated to be 145 Won /
passenger in the SAR). Adding depreciation, the estimated total subsidies for each passenger would be 269
Won / passenger (unit subsidies was estimated to be 63 Won / passenger in the SAR). Further analysis of
the total unit working costs shows that two thirds of the cost is for labor (386 Won / passenger). To reduce
the labor and to improv'e the operating efficiency, one example is to use the machines to replace the current
manual ticket sales in each subway station.
19. Traffic: Currently the system transports about 250 million passengers a year. Considering the
city's 3.75 million residents, the average person only uses the system less than 6 times per month (or less
than three round trips per person per month). This number is not very high and the system has large excess
capacity to handle more passengers. Given the factors of (a) the quality railcar maintenance and the
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services provided by the system, (b) the low fare policy, and (c) the upward trend of traffic demand over
the last three years after the Asia economic crisis in 1997-1998, the PUTA should have more leverages to
lure more passengers. One of the possible ways to increase the subway traffic would be to upgrade the
feeder line services. Assign more local bus routes to connect with the subway stations to encourage the
potential customers to use the system.
20. Debt: Reduction of the financial burdens of the company would lead the PUTA to better business
practices and less financial dependency on the government. The current high debt status is not only niining
all the financial ratios but also draining off the cash reserves of the company. In the 2001 income
statement, the total interest payments alone was 102.8% of the total operating revenue. This means that the
total gross operating income of the company cannot meet the total interest payments in that year. The high
portion of the short-term debt (paras 4 and 15) has been causing difficulties for the company in carrying
out normal business decisions and the development plan. Debt reduction is one of the important factors to
improve the future financial condition of the PUTA.
PART H: THE FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT
Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR)
21. The calculation of the FIRR is focused on Line 2 construction (the project) only, and not for the
entire PUTA. The low fare policy, as the government intended, produces a large financial impact on FIRR.
It is estimated that Line 2 operations will not be profitable until 2006. The FIRR of the project is expected
to be 0.7 percent. There are no FIRR and NPV calculations in the SAR. The results are summarized as
below:
PUTA: FMRR and Net Present Value
FIRR (in %) 0.7
Net Present Value (Won billion, 5.14%) -134.97
Sensitivity Analysis
22. The sensitivity analysis tested different scenarios on the bases of the change of some major
parameters assumed in the analysis. The principal endogenous and exogenous parameters that could affect
the project financial results are: traffic growth rate, fare growth rate, total working costs and changes in
interest payments. The results show that: (a) changes in fare and working costs have the greatest impact
on the financial evaluation, (b) there is a moderate impact on changes in traffic growth rate, and (c) the
least impact is caused by changes in interest payments. The financial results summary by different
scenarios is shown as follows:
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PUTA: FINANCIAL SENSITIVTY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
FIRR (in %) NPV (Won biWlion, 5.14%)
Traffic Growth Rate: 3% pa 2.9 -77.43
1% pa -2.0 -185.02
Fare Growth Rate: 8% pa 8 9 169.88
4% pa -18.6 -372.27
Working Cost Growth Rate: 7% pa -28.4 453.69
3% pa 7.9 109.35
Interest Payments +15% 0.6 -138.02
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (Financial Simulation)
24. To determine the degree of uncertainty for the project, a probabilistic risk analysis using Monte
Carlo techniques was carried out. In a Monte Carlo analysis, each uncertainty factor is allowed to vary at
random between set limits and all uncertainty factors are allowed to change simultaneously. Monte Carlo
simulation provides probability distributions of the potential outcomes of decisions. By analyzing these
distributions, we can assess the risk associated with making various decisions (or probabilistic risk
analysis). The product of the analysis is a judgment on the possible range of the decision variable, and on
the likelihood of each value within this range.
25. For the project, four uncertain factors that may affect the result of financial evaluation have been
identified: (a) traffic growth rate, (b) fare growth rate, (c) total working costs, and (d) interest payments.
The result of financial probabilistic analysis reveals that the most likely FIRR on the project would be 0.3
percent, while the worst and the best FIRR would be -1.8 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively. The details
of the FIRR and NPV are in Table 5 and summarized as follows:
PUTA: Summary of Financial Probabilistic Analysis
Range of FIRR & Most Likely FRR Std. Error of the
NPV &NPV Mean
FIRR (in %) - 1.8% - 2.1% 0.3% 0.1%
NPV(Wonbillion, - 194.11 - - 99.87 -147.02 2.77
5.14% ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Scenarios Analysis (Financial Alternative)
26. There are two special features of PUTA's accounting practice: (a) It is owned by MOT (the
central government) but 50% of the construction costs are grants from the PCG (the local government), and
(b) the PCG does not own PUTA, but can determine the fare. Three financial scenarios have been tested on
the basis of these two features:
27. The first scenario is a complete decentralization of the PUTA from the central government (MOT)
to the local government (PCG). Without subsidies from MOT, a fare increase is inevitable. An 8% annual
fare increase (current assumption is 6% pa) would be able to shorten the number of losing years by half,
from the entire project life of 20 years (2002-2022) to the first ten years (2002-2012) and there would be
no cash shortage in 2002. The FIRR and NPV of the project would be expected to be 8.9% and Won
169.88 billion, respectively.
28. The second scenario is to convert part of the debt, particularly for the short and medium term debt,
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to equity. This one time financial assistance can reduce financial obligations and help to restore financial
leverage of the company. If 50% of debt is converted into equity, the PUTA would be able to balance its
income statement in 2010. There would be no cash flow deficit over the entire project life. The solvency
problems and the financial leverage would be restored in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The FIRR and NPV
of the project would be expected at 0.9% and Won -124.79 billion, respectively.
29. The third scenario is to combine the first and second scenarios by increasing the fare growth rate of
8% pa and converting 50% of debt into equity. The PUTA would be able to balance its income statement
in 2008 with no cash flow deficit for the entire project life, and the solvency problems along with the
financial leverage would be restored before 2008. The FIRR and NPV of the project would be expected at
9.2% and Won 180.06 billion, respectively.
30. Comments: The first scenario (increasing the fare) meets the minimum financial requirement to
operate the system. For the long-term financial viability, the fare must be able to exceed or become close to
its working cost. The second scenario (reduce the debt) is to improve the financial borrowing structure of
the company. Reduction of the debt will restore the company's financial leverage and liquidation capacity.
The third scenario is the combination of the first and the second scenarios. It is the most desirable solution
because it will enhance the profitability as well as the financial strength of the company. The FIRR and
NPV of the project for the third scenario also show the best results for the company.
31. Recommendations: The current total operating revenue cannot cover its total operating expenses.
The addition of heavy debt has put PUTA in a very difficult financial situation for its daily operations and
long term development. Decentralization of the company to the local government will end the subsidies
from the central government and motivate the PCG to adjust its low fare policy. For long term financial
viability, the fare should reflect or lean towards the real operating cost of the system. In addition,
converting 50% of the total debt into equity will fundamentally improve the financial structure of the
company. It is estimated that the total debt of the PUTA, at end of 2001, was Won 2,764.6 billion (or
about US$ 2,236.8 million). If the 50% debt reduction is shared equally between MOT and the PCG, it
would mean a one time payment of US$ 559.2 million from each party. This is a small price to pay
considering that the total subsidies (MOT and the PCG) to PUTA, in 2001 alone, was Won 461.8 billion
(or about US$ 373.62 million).
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Table 1: Income Statement - PUTA
(Won million, year ending
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
UNIT VOLUMES
Passenger trffic (OOOS) 195,640 213,799 218,347 218,307 203,430 224,254 240,920 250,238 282,499 304,775 310,871 317,088 354,090 448,524
Track(km) 325 32.5 325 325 325 549 549 629 716 716 716 716 899 1011
Passenger ('OOOSy km 6,020 6,581 6,705 6,716 6,256 4,415 4,375 3,975 3,946 4,257 4,342 4,429 3,939 4,436
Operating Income/passenger (99 7) (106 1) (123 3) (52.4) (190 4) (354.8) (280 3) (269 6) (280 8) (296 5) (299 0) (299 0) (300 8) (216 6)
Operating Income (million)/
km (600) (698) (827) (352) (1,191) (1,566) (1,226) (1,072) (1,108) (1,262) (1,298) (1,324) (1,185) (961)
OPERATING REVENUES
Passenger Fares 64,960 72,094 81,060 85,386 80,713 89,413 106,569 124,963 149,724 171,284 185,279 200,400 237,241 318,452
OtherRevenue 2,835 7,986 9,624 10,850 6,833 6,760 10,265 13,640 16,385 18,591 20,207 21,879 25,849 34,536
Total operating revenue 67.795 80.080 90.684 96.23 87.546 96.173 116.834 138603 166.109 189.875 205.486 222.279 263.090 352,988
OPERATING EXPENSES
Labor 44,387 49,371 59,798 61,567 60,419 77,651 88,210 96,391 114,412 129,529 138,648 148,397 173,858 231,438
Matenals & Supplies 2,689 4,711 5,065 7,304 12,879 16,305 10,385 13,624 16,102 18,287 19,585 20,928 24,432 32,294
Electnc Power 5,493 5,941 6,132 7,412 8,936 12,656 13,715 15,610 18,362 20,725 22,072 23,782 27,973 37,227
Other Expenses & Claims 5,448 7,276 8,242 9,599 10,314 14,313 15,385 19,868 23,447 26,515 28,289 30,440 35,763 47,544
Subtotal working cost 58017 67.29 79.237 85.882 92548 120.925 127.695 145.493 172.323 195.056 208.594 223.547 262.026 348.503
Depreciation,
Rolling Stock 9,447 13,765 16,311 10,294 12,135 9,874 10,718 12,691 14,623 17,038 17,970 18,709 21,514 20,327
Facilities& Equipment 19,832 21,713 22,010 11,489 21,569 51,373 45,748 47,819 58,490 68,153 71,880 74,836 86,055 81,307
Subtotal depreciaton 29.279 35.478 38.321 21.783 33.704 61,247 56.466 60.510 73.113 85.191 89.850 93.545 107.569 101.634
Total operating expenses 87.296 102.777 117.558 107.665 126.252 182.172 184.161 206.003 245.436 280.247 298.444 317.092 3692595 450.137
OPERATING INCOME /
(LOSS) (19.$011 (22.697) (26.874) (11.4291 (38.7061 (85.999) (67.3271 (67.400) (79.327) (90372) (92.958) (94.813) (106.5051 (97.149)
NON-OPERATING
INCOME 12,479 26,281 12,667 12,136 54,531 13,677 5,654 6,878 7,345 8,229 8,704 9,196 10,623 13,904
NON-OPERATING EXPENSES
Interest (net) * 66,046 83,413 89,909 102,878 97,314 99,059 166,461 142,537 298,086 303,955 338,831 371,595 420,958 373,228
Others 49,837 25,012 45,484 57,132 5,955 6,902 29,370 18,655 19,215 19,791 20,385 20,996 21,626 22,275
Total non-opeatmng expenses 115.883 108.425 135.393 160.010 103.269 105.961 195.831 161.192 317.301 323.746 359.216 392.591 442.584 395.503
EXTRAORDINARY
INCOME 150 30 484 94 133,526 142,321 150,432 123,572 130,232 144,159 150,772 157,593 180,232 234,129
NET INCOME H22.755 1104.81 (149.1161 (152209) 46.082 (351962) (1072072 (28.142 (259.0511 (261.730) £292,698) (320.615 (358.2343 (244.619)
INCOME TAX (29.7% after
2001) - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _
NET INCOME AFTER
INCOMETAX (122755 (1) 41 (1497116) (159.209 46-082 (35962) (1070722 (98142 (259051) f261.730 (292-6981 (32261) f358234) (244,619)
Worldng Rado 85.6% 84.0% 87.4% 89.2% 105.7% 125.7% 109.3% 105.0% 103.7% 102.7% 101.5% 100.6% 99.6% 98.7%
Operating Ratio 128.8% 128.3% 129.6% 111.9% 144.2% 189A% 157.6% 148.6% 147.8% 147.6% 145.2% 142.7% 140.5% 127.5%
Rate of Return on Net Fixed
Assets - -6.4% -7.7% -11.1% 2.2% -1.9% -5.2% 4.3% -13.8% -12.3% -12.3% -12.4% -13.4% -9.0%
Actual 1994-2001
Best estimate 2002
Forecast 2003 thereafter
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Table 2: Sources And Applications of IFunds - PUTA
(Won million, year endlng December 31)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Intemal Sources:
Net Income (122,755) (104,811) (149,116) (159,209) 46,082 (35.962) (107,072) (98,142) (259,051) (261,730) (292,698) (320,615) (358,234) (244.619)
Depreciation 29,279 35,478 38,321 21,783 33,704 61,247 56.466 60,510 73,113 85,191 89.850 93,545 107,569 101,634
Interest on Long-Tern Debt 66,046 83,413 89,909 102,878 97.310 99,059 166.461 142.537 298,086 303,955 338.831 371,595 420.958 373.228
Othmer 26.842 (2,399) 35,132 47,254 4,344 19,913 41,658 18,142 19,825 23,363 26,267 27,677 29,172 38,373
Subtotal (38 11,681 14.246 12706 11M440 1A4.2V 15721.1 123E042 131Q73 150779 162.250 172.202 199465 268.616
Bofoinjwms.
IBRD - - 13,636 - 55,219 7,934 - 18,593 6.380 - - - - -
Project-Related Debt 104,010 319.073 71,883 10D,178 365,000 310.000 420,000 420,000 551,900 241,733 282.254 252,648 936.959 830,159
Bonds 119,039 131.698 1564634 171,799 72,270 99,920 112,569 135.791 156,146 157,707 159,285 160,877 162,486 164,111
Musc Short-Temn Debt - - - - - - - 421,331 - - - - - -
Subtotal 223.042 450.71 242173 271.977 4922489 417854 32.569 995.715 7 21442 3992440 441353 412225 1.099.445 994720
Govemment Contnbutions.
National Govemment 156,000 202,500 291.100 291,800 264,091 270,550 347,010 330,500 400,542 424.819 442,382 456,516 412,970 344,959
City of Pusan 60,000 93,583 101,300 8,o000 68,700 124,590 140,200 131,300 115,129 197,734 205.100 230,543 184,462 152,933
Subtotal 21600 298 083 32.4 372 008 3322791 32540 48270 2 46L8 1 671 fi 64482 687.059 297 432 4972.82
Total Sources of Funds 438.461 760-535 648.819 66e0483 1.06.720 9572251 2422722 "S0. 562 1.362.070 1.1722792 t 5b271 1.2727.6 L96-342 L.760.778
APPLICATIONS OF FUNDS
Capital Expenditures 223,457 225,211 267,178 413,879 421,097 443.912 393,094 378.620 383,764 424.100 410,400 392,800 236,600 167,400
Debt Services,
Interest Payment.
On Preo'94 Debt 91,940 101,774 122,652 59,490 58,825 44,758 118.409 146,069 236,032 276,073 302,108 331,101 373,120 338,099
IBRD - - 918 725 3,500 4,007 3,509 3,643 4,151 3,700 3,227 2,728 2,205 1,658
Project-Related Debt 2,108 10,311 2,643 - - - - - - - - - - -
Bonds 3.366 3,951 4.700 42.663 34.989 50,294 44,543 53.150 58,106 2,443 33,794 38.074 45,928 33.728
Misc. Short-Ten Debl - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Subtotal 27.414 116.036 130913 102.878 972314 2292 166.461 202.862 29R.2829 82.216 33212 371903 421.253 373A.8
Prncipal Repayment
On Pr '94 Debt 99,667 293,298 194,662 109,411 217,265 152,125 306,497 696,756 526,758 316,230 330,683 290.016 952,714 827,1u4
IBRD - - - - - - 8,883 10,162 8,904 9,355 9,828 10,327 10,850 11,397
Project-Related Debt - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bonds - - - 91,622 92,385 119,046 131.698 156,417 171,799 72,270 99,916 112,569 135.791 156,146
Misc. Short-Term Debt - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Subtotal 992667 293.228 196.662 201033 0 650 2721171 447-072 863.335 7087461 3972.55 440427 412.912 13-2.23 994.727
Total Debt Services 197,081 409,334 325,575 303,911 406,964 370,230 613,539 1,066,197 1,005.750 680,071 779,556 784.815 1,520,608 1,368,212
Change in Woring Capital 11.421 11,034 41,143 30,804 202,288 160,530 190,372 144,801 (17,694) (63,866) (17,476) (17,824) (106,0S6) (270,738)
Total Application of Funds 4321959 64s-579 633.9 748.64 3030.342 974.672 122.005 3.182.618 13732830 1.040.302 3.1Q22 312.92798 1 1653.122 1364.824
Net Funds Flow 6CM02 114.956 14.923 (18.2911 (23.6291 (17.421 (1927131 f.0561 (927601 132487 782791 112295 24.220 4956.04
Opening Balance 31.072 37,574 152,530 167,453 79,262 55,633 38212 18.499 9,443 (317) 132.170 210,960 323,956 569.176
Closing Balance 37,574 152,530 167,453 79,262 53,633 38,212 18,499 9,443 (317) 132,170 210,960 323,956 569,176 1,065.080
Debt Service Coverage Ratlo 0.00 1.31 1.17 0.81 1A4 1.39 1.28 1.13 0.97 1.10 1.08 1.12 1.09 1.16
Actual. 1994-2001
Best estimate 2002
Forecast: 2003 thereafter
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Table 3: Balance Sheet - PUTA
(Won million, year ending December 31)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ASSETS:
Fixed Assets.
1,843,55
At cost 1,599,568 01,327,1661,981,214 1,688,436 1,801,998 1,969,843 2,276,854 2,616,134 2,944,454 3,258,694 3,447,974 3,581,894
Less Depreciation 50,992 89,313 111,096 144,800 206,047 262,513 323,023 396,136 481,327 571,177 664,722 772,291 873,925
1.932.86
Subtotal 1,650.560 11.438-2622.126.011.894,483 2.064.5112.292866 1880718 2.134.807 22373177 2.593972 2.6752683 2.707.96.
Current Assets.
Cash 152,530 167,453 79,262 55,633 38,212 18,499 9,443 (317) 132,170 210,960 323,956 569,176 1,065,080
Inventory 56,089 51,661 43,206 39,068 59,306 57,973 47,302 53,675 57,907 59,065 60,247 67,277 85,220
Receivable and others 20,495 62,066 52,363 20,761 11,232 1,347 790 847 914 933 951 1,062 1,346
Subtotal 229.114 281.180 174.831 115.462 108.75 77.819 5 54.205 1°991 2702958 385.154 637.515 .151.646
Other Assets 7,108 2,070 185,902 1,837 448,939 437,762 427,878 480,248 518,118 528,481 539,050 601,954 762,490
Total Assets AI)1 2 2,1 f2L
LtABILITIES & EQUITY:
Equity- State funds 53,577 296,835(429,414)(109,969) (52,617) (27,690) 13,634 (681,016) (496,420) (234,429) 42,892 34,322 (293,713)
Lena-terrn Debts:
BoTowings- Local 1,254,18
currency 1,158,116 11,271,2261,131,7921,173,0371,184,5821,299,545 1,468,994 1,584,831 1,616,529 1,648,858 1,841,270 2,332,323
Borrowings- Foreign
Currency 339,567 309,261 466,789 754,629 667,106 607,673 581,123 713,309 769,557 784,949 800,647 894,078 1,132,522
Accrued Severance
Benefits 30,806 40,528 48,741 44,191 43,591 40,756 43,644 49,437 53,336 54,402 55,490 61,966 78,492
1.603.97
Subtotal 1.528.489 01786.7561.930.6121.883.734 1.833011 1924.312 2.231.740 2A07.724 2.455.880 2.504.995 2.797314 3.543337
Current Liabilities
Shott-termborrowvngs 100,446 110,396 213,796 189,043 109,918 - 168,169 169,499 182,865 186,523 190,253 212,454 269,114
Current Portion of Long-
tern Borrowings 86,179 90,570 101,444 82,580 338,481 608,108 540,441 564,998 609,550 621,742 634,176 708,181 897,047
Other Payable and
Accrued Expenses 16,623 7,673 15,118 143,242 160,512 152,866 114,838 113,000 121,910 124,348 126,835 141,636 179,409
Others 101,468 106,669 111,295 7,805 12.144 13,797 16,885 16,950 18,287 18,652 19,025 21,245 26,911
Subtotal 304716 315.308 441.653 422.670 621.055 774.771 40.333 864A47 932.612 951.265 970289 1.083.516 1372.481
Other Liabilities -
Total Liabilities & Equity 2
Current Ratios 0.75 0.89 OAO 0.27 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.28 0.40 0.59 0.84
Debt/equity ratio 97/3 87/13 124/-24 105/-5 102/-2 101/-1 100/0 128/-28 117/-17 107/-7 99/1 99/1 106/4
Actual. 1995-2001
Best esumate 2002
Forecast 2003 thereafter
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Table 4: Pusan Urban Tiransit Authority
Assumptions for Financial Forecasts
1. Passenger Traffic: 2% pa. after completion
2. Fare Rate: 555 Won/ passenger
Increase 6.0% every year.
3. Operating Cost: Increase 5 % pa.
Labor 386 Won/ passenger
Matenals & Supplies 54 Won/ passenger
Electrc Power 62 Won/ passenger
Other Expenses & Claims 79 Won/ passenger
Major Mamtenance (/ 10 year)
Depreciation 30 years
4. Income tax 29.7% After 2001
5. Borrowing.
The IBRD 5.0% on 15 year maturies, LIBOR US$ based single currency
including 5 years grace period.
Others Mostly are 3-5 years maturities and the current tnterest
rate mostly is in the range of 5-6%.
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Table 5: PUSAN URBAN TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT PROJECT
FIRR SIMULATION AND PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS - PUTA
Summary.
Display Range is from -10 0% to 10 0% (In %)
Entire Range is from -9 7% to 8 3% (in %)
After 974 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0 1%
Statistics Value Percentiles.
Tnals 974
Mean -0 1% Percentile fmi %
Median 0.3% 0% -9 7%
Mode -6 3% 10% -5.4%
Standard Deviation 3 6% Low Scenano 20% -3 1%
Variance 01% 30% -1.8%
Skewness -0 40 Most Likely 40% -0 7%
Kurtosis 2 70 _ 50% 0 3%
Coeff of Variability -32.45 High Scenano 60% 1 1%
Range Minimum -9 7% 70% 2.1%
Range Maximum 8 3% 80% 31%
Range Width 18 0% 90% 41%
Mean Std Error 012% 100% 8 3%
Foreast FIMR On the Total Probet- PUTA
974 Trals Frquency Chart 0 OuiUs
030 29
ms o I 11llllllllllllII i litlll]llltll I.I~II"5 IV 015 15 L
Om ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~725
025 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
.100% .50% 00% 5 0% 10 0%
(in%)
Assumptions
Fare Growth Rate Traffic Growth Rate
Normal distnbution with parameters. Normal distnbution with parameters:
Mean 100.0% Mean 100 0%
Standard Dev. 100% Standard Dev 15.0%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 99 8% Mean value in simulation was 100 6%
Working Cost Interest Payments
Tnangular distribution with parameters. Tnangular distribution with parameters
Minimum 90.0% Minimum 90.0%
Likeliest 105.0% Likeliest 100.0%
Maximum 110 0% Maximum 110 0%
Selected range is from 90 0% to 110 0% Selected range is from 90 0% to 110.0%
Mean value in simulation was 10 1.6% Mean value in simulation was 99.8%
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Annex 4. Bank llnputs
(a) Missions:
Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating
(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development
Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective
Identification/Preparation
September 5 - 19, 4 Urban Transport Specialist,
1992 Senior Financial Analyst, 2
consultants
May 23 - 28, 1993 4 Urban Transport Specialist,
Senior Financial Analyst, 2
consultants
August 30 - 5 Urban Transport Specialist,
September 4, 1993 Senior Financial Analyst, 3
consultants
February 14 - 25, 4 Urban Transport Specialist,
1994 Senior Financial Analyst, 2
consultants
Appraisal/Negotlataon
May 25 - June 11, 4 Urban Transport Specialist,
1994 Senior Legal Counsel, Senior
Procurement Specialist,
Senior Financial Analyst
Supervision
March 3 - 6, 1 Principal Transport HS HS
1996 Specialist
December 4 - 9, 2 Principal Transport Specialist, HS HS
1996 Financial Analyst
September 29 - I Principal Transport Specialist HS HS
October 2, 1997
June 1998 1 Principal Transport Specialist HS HS
March 5 - 8, 1999 2 Principal Transport Specialist, S S
Transport Engineer
November 3 - 5, 1 Transport Engineer S S
1999
April 2 - 4, 2001 1 Senior Transport Engineer S S
ICR
April 22 - 26, 3 Senior Engineer, Financial S S
2002 Analyst, Consultant
October - February 3 Senior Transport Economist, S S
2003 Financial Analyst, Consultant
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(b) Staff
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate
No. Staff weeks US$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation 101.9 328.4
AppraisalNegotiation 54.4 90.1
Supervision 89.4 92 6
ICR 16 2 64.7
Total 261.5 574 6
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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Neghgible, NA=Not Applicable)
Raing
O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N O NA
3 Sector Policies OH OSUOM O N O NA
F Physical O H OSUOM O N O NA
Z Financial O H OSUOM O N O NA
!; Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA
El Environmental O H OSUOM O N O NA
Social
O Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NA
El Gender OH OSUOM ON ONA
O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA
El Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA
O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA
O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA
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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6 1 Bank performance Rating
0 Lending OHS*S OU OHU
0 Supervision OHS OS OU OHU
F Overall OHS OS OU O HU
62 Borrowerperformance Rating
2 Preparation OHS OS OU 0 HU
F Government implementation performance O HS OS O U 0 HU
3 Implementation agency performance O HS OS 0 U 0 HU
X Overall OHS OS 0 U O HU
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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
I. Study on Pusan's Fare Structure of Mass Transits, KOTI, January, 1997.
2. Pusan Urban Transportation Management Project Fmal Report, Transportation and Environmental
Research Institute (TERI), November 1996.
3. Pusan Urban Subway Financing Study Final Report, Arthur Andersen (Korea Office), October 1996.
4. Korea Transport Sector, Resource Mobilization Challenges and Opportunities, The World Bank,
April, 1995
5. Detailed Engineerng Design of Pusan Modal Integration Facilities Final Summary Report, Yoo-Shin
Engineering Corporation, February 1995.
6. Staff Appraisal Report, Pusan Urban Transport Management Project, November 1994
7. Economic Analysis of Modal Integration Facilities (Nopo and Tongnae), Technical Memo, Yoo-Shin
Engineering Corporation, August, 1994.
8. Pusan Modal Integration and Congestion Management Study Yoo-Shin Engineering Corporation,
January, 1993.
9. East West Highway Plan, Pusan City Government, July 1992.
10. Basic Plan for the Establishment of East-West Urban Rail Transit m Pusan City, Korea Transport
Institute (KOTI), October, 1990.
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